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INTRODUCTION

Settlements dominate the landscape of class actions. The overwhelming majority of civil actions certified to proceed on a class-wide
basis and not otherwise resolved by dispositive motions result in settlement, not trial.' This is far from unusual in civil litigation generally, where observations about "the vanishing trial" have become
commonplace. Seemingly, the paucity of actual trials should have
been integrated into the core structures of the class action. That,
however, is not so, and the failure to integrate the fact of settlement
into class action law permeates the difficulties now facing the field.
In its most obvious form, the question of trial remains at the core
of the certification of class actions under Rule 23(b) (3). So long as
the prescribed inquiry speaks to the "manageability" of the aggregated
proceeding at trial and so long as a court must assess the "predominance" of the aggregate issues versus the individual ones in the case,
procedural law inevitably directs the attention of the litigants to the
hypothetical scenario of a class-wide trial.4 The Supreme Court recI See ROBERT H. KLONOFF ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY
LITIGATION 415 (2d ed. 2006) ("Relatively few class actions actually go to trial; most settle,
either after the certification decision or as trial approaches.").
2 See Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, I J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004)
(documenting and analyzing data on the decreasing number of civil trials).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
4 For discussion of certification battles post-Amchem, see Richard A. Nagareda,
Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747,
752-54 (2002) (discussing John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Bruce Hay
& David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail"Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337; George L. Priest, Procedural
Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521 (1997);
Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating
Settlement Proceeds,84 VA. L. REV. 1465 (1998)).
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ognized this tension in Amchemn Products, Inc. v. Windsor< mildly distancing settled cases from any stringent proof as to the manageability
of an ultimate trial, but the issue persists across the perennial certification battles.
This Article focuses on a second, and less explored, consequence
of the fact of settlement over trial as the primary form of case resolution. It is commonplace by now to understand the class-certification
decision as setting the value of the asserted legal claims. Some cases
have value when aggregated but are simply not viable-they have
"negative value," in the modern economic parlance of class action
law-as individual claims. But the value of claims is established not
just at the front end, where the conditions for certification dominate
the case law and the academic literature, but also at the back end; inevitably, part of the value generated by the resolution of a claim
through settlement (or even at trial) is the finality it may offer to the
litigants.
One would think that a world in which settlements comprise the
endgame for class actions would have produced, with relative ease and
rapidity, a consensus on the legal principles that govern the preclusive
effect of those settlements. At the end of the day, all litigation is ultimately about repose. The value of a claim, whether litigated or settled, is a function of the price of peace on the disputed issue. That
price may be as low as zero for meritless claims, but for claims that
have at least some viability, the value corresponds directly to the finality that resolution offers the defendant. The purpose of a judgment,
whether litigated or settled, is precisely the certainty that finality offers
the parties.
Our aim in this Article is to provide a cohesive framework for establishing the finality of class actions under the real-world conditions
of settlement. This is far from a secondary issue in class action litigation. One of the major flashpoints in class action law for some time
has concerned the proper parameters for collateral attacks on the
binding effect of class settlements. While less contentious for most
parties than the initial decision to certify a class, the context of collateral challenge exposes many of the critical frailties of the class action.
Further, we shall contend, the policy implications of collateral chal-

5 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) ("Confronted with a request for settlement-only class
certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, wotuld present
intractable management problems,... for the proposal is that there be no trial.").
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lenge raise many of the same concerns as animated the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).6
We should begin with the foundational basics. In a collateral attack, an absent class member sues the settling defendant, advancing
claims that the class settlement purportedly resolved. The defendant
responds that the new lawsuit is barred by claim preclusion. The collateral attack plaintiff then seeks to parry by arguing that the judgment said to lend preclusive effect to the class settlement is defective
on federal constitutional due process grounds-characteristically, because the plaintiff was inadequately represented in the class proceedings.7 At least for the class action in its modern form," a determination of adequate representation is a precondition to the entry of a
class-wide judgment)' Collateral attacks ask what latitude the plaintiff
should have to revisit the adequacy question-usually, in a court different from the one that entered the classjudgment said to be binding.
The binding effect of a class settlement is ultimately a question of
proper preclusion-in less formal terms, of what it should take for the
law to regard the binding of an absent class member to a class settlement as fundamentally fair, such that she may not sue the defendant
anew. Not surprisingly, courts have attempted to address this topic
through application of ordinary preclusion principles to the class action setting. This process of application has not run smoothly, however. Prescriptions in case law run the gamut of the usual preclusion
categories. Some judges urge the application of claim preclusion
principles, asking whether the collateral attack plaintiff had a "full and
fair opportunity" to raise the alleged constitutional defect in the classsettlement court. ° Others point to issue preclusion principles, asking
whether the asserted defect was actually litigated in and determined

Pub. L No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
Due process challenges might also encompass the adequacy of notice afforded to
the class.
8 But see infra text accompanying notes 175-177 (discussing
the dramatic difference between the modern class action and Illinois equitable procedures at the time of
the Supreme Court's landmark 1940 decision in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
6

7

(1940)).

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (4) (conditioning class certification on a judicial
determination that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class"); 23(g)(1)(B) (requiring judicial appointment of class counsel
who will "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class").
10 See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1999) (Epstein III)
(O'Scannlain, J.).
9
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by the rendering court." Still others advocate no preclusion, positing
that the collateral-attack court should determine the constitutional
question de novo.12 In a long-running series of articles, commentators
have splintered similarly over how to handle collateral attacks.13
For its part, the Supreme Court appeared poised to lend greater
clarity to this area in 2002. The Court granted review to consider a
collateral attack on the binding effect of a much-discussed class action
settlement concerning latent-disease claims in tort related to the Viet-

It See, e.g., Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 439
F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir.
2006) ("[]f,in the class action, a defendant opposing class certification or an objector
to the settlement had made a serious argument that a sub-class was required because of
claims substantially similar to hers, and that argument had been considered and rejected by the class action court, it would not be unfair to preclude collateral review of
that ruling and relegate [the collateral attack plaintiff] to her direct review remedies."); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Once a
court has decided that the due process protections did occur for a particular class
member or group of class members, the issue may not be relitigated."); Epstein I1, 179
F.3d at 651 (Wiggins, J., concurring) (focusing on whether "the adequacy of representation issue was fully and fairly litigated and necessarily decided" by the rendering court).
See, e.g.,
Epstein Il,179 F.3d at 655 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "none
of the [rendering court's] findings address the claim of the plaintiffs before this court
today: namely, that the ... plaintiffs were inadequately represented before the [rendering] court, and that, consequently, a decision to bind them to the terms of the settlement would violate their rights to due process"); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d
1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 1997) (Epstein II) (Norris, J.) (contending that to disallow collateral attack "would be to require absent class members to monitor the proceedings [in
the rendering court] in order to secure their rights to adequate representation," something they "are not required" to do), rev'd on reh'g, 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
13For commentary advocating relatively broad latitude for collateral
attacks, see,
David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation after Stephenson: A Rawlsian/BehavioralEconomics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279 (2006); Susan P. Koniak,
How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representation, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1787 (2004); Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (1998); Patrick
Woolley, The Availability of CollateralAttack for Inadequate Relnesentation in Class Suits, 79
TEX. L. REv. 383 (2000). For commentary advocating more circumscribed parameters,
see, for example, Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The InadequateSearchfor "Adequacy"
in Class Actions: A Critiqueof Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998); Marcel
Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SuP. CT. REx'. 219 [hereinafter Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond]; Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REv. 287 (2003). The latest addition to this literature seeks to
chart a "middle-ground approach." See William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action
Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 790, 829 (2007) (concluding that "a
resort to policy" does not "easily resolve[] the adequacy question in either direction").
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nam War era defoliant Agent Orange.14 But the eight sitting Justices
split four to four,' thereby frustrating any hopes for clarification.
This Article frames the ongoing debates over collateral attacks on
class settlements as part of an unresolved conflict between the individualist premise of our inherited tradition of civil litigation and the
reality of circumscribed litigant autonomy in aggregate litigation,
most notably in class actions. Of necessity, aggregation in any form
limits the control that any litigant may exercise over her claims or defenses. Class actions further compromise litigant autonomy, for absent class members typically express their consent to a binding settlement not affirmatively but only tacitly, through their failure to
withdraw from the class representation. " Class settlements accordingly present a paradox. They require the same certainty of termination as any other case where legal claims are surrendered in exchange
for a payment or a release. Yet the contractual terms that underlie
class settlements are deeply problematic because the contracting party
is an agent-class counsel-who can claim only indirect authorization
to represent the absent class members.
Our claim is that the binding effect of a class settlement cannot be
resolved simply within our inherited litigation vocabulary. In a landmark 1989 case involving a civil rights consent decree, for example,
Justice Stevens, in dissent, tried to limit the scope of potential challenges to a class settlement to only those grounds that would justify relief from a conventional settlement, such as fraud or collusion. 7 This
argument was necessarily unavailing where the persons seeking to
challenge the impact of a decree upon them-the white incumbent
firefighters of Birmingham, Alabama-were not even nominally represented in the prior action. But even non-participation in a prior
litigation does not necessarily delimit the controversy. In the seminal
1940 case of Hansbeny v. Lee,"s ajudgment enforcing a racially restric-

14 See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. granted,
537

U.S. 999 (2002), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). On the background of the Agent Orange class settlement, see PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE
ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (enlarged ed. 1987).

Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). Justice Stevens recused
himself. Id. at 112.
16 See infra Part I.C (discussing exit rights as a component of
due process in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)).
17 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 771 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Persons who
have no right to appeal from a final judgment... may nevertheless collaterally attack a
judgment on certain narrow grounds.").
15

18

311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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tive covenant would necessarily implicate the rights of aspiring African
American homeowners in the future, a concern that bewildered the
Court as it sought to disengage from the legal protection of American
racialism.' 9
We urge a new approach that is more responsive to the realities of
class action settlements: proper preclusion in the class action setting
flows from proper coordination of what we term the "where," "what,"
and "how" of class-settlement review. More specifically, challenges to
the preclusive effect of a class settlement implicate the forum for the
class action, the structure of the representation, and the form that the
particular challenge at hand may take. Each of these dimensions
speaks to distinctive features of the class action as a form of aggregate
litigation in an integrated national market for goods and services.
Our account seeks to advance the literature in two ways: first, simply
by laying out the three pertinent dimensions as the appropriate terms
for the debate, and second, by explaining how proper preclusion consists of the necessary coordination of these three dimensions in the
context of a specific challenge.
The "where" question speaks to forum selection. Surprisingly
enough, CAFA helps to situate the discussion of class settlements, even
though the statute says precious little on that subject. 20 Both CAFA
and the debate over the binding effect of class settlements focus, in
substantial part, on how to address the problem of the anomalous
court in a world of national markets. Political rhetoric aside,2 ' the
core justification for CAFA stems from the problem of the anomalous
court-usually thought to be a state court-selected for its inclination
to reward the first-mover plaintiff in two distinct ways.
First, such a court might be inclined to certify a nationwide class
action when the overwhelming majority of other courts in the federal
19 See Nagareda, supra note 13, at 298-309
(discussing the Hansberty decision and
the confusion it creates in determining adequacy of class representation).
20 On the meager guidance provided by CAFA directly
on class settlements, see
Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action FairnessAct: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. RE'. 1695, 1697 (2006), noting that "[o]n the settlement front,... Congress lacked any clear understanding of what it was trying to fix.
[and] passed a series of Unrelated provisions that... raise more questions than they
answer.
2 Other articles for this Symposium explore
the political rhetoric behind CAFA.
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in HistoricalContext: A Prelitinary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439 (2008); Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA's Stated
JnrisdictionalPolicy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2008); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the Alm in FederalJurisdictionalRefonn, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008).
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system, other states' systems, and quite arguably within the state's own
judicial system would be disinclined to certify. Second, the anomalous
court might couple the certification with interpretations of substantive
law favorable to the plaintiff class. CAFA seeks to address this problem by pulling national-market cases into the federal judicial systern 22 -a system thought both less susceptible to capture and more
capable of remedying improper
forum selection through transfer 23 or
S
24
multidistrict consolidation.
CAFA's treatment of the anomalous court, however, is incomplete
for a variety of reasons. In the settlement context, the mechanisms for
removal still allow willing parties to shop a settlement to an anomalous
court inclined to grant dispensation from further litigation. Further,
CAFA says nothing about the outer bounds of preclusion when
anomalous courts are induced to launch a collateral attack on a class
settlement. Judicial review for class settlements-as distinct from contested class certification determinations-must account for both the
anomalous court inclined to approve a class-settlement agreement (on
the part of the settling defendant and class counsel) and the anomalous court inclined to bust the deal under the auspices of federal constitutional due process (at the behest of a dissenting plaintiff in a collateral attack).
The "what" question surrounding review of class settlements concerns the content of the federal constitutional command itself. The
varying prescriptions for handling collateral attacks stem, in part,
from the tendency of class action doctrine, over time, to encompass
within the rubric of "adequate representation" an inconsistent array of
concerns. Adequate representation encompasses the problem of
structural conflicts of interest-conflicts arising from material differences among the members of the would-be class or conflicts between

22

See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA

L. REv. 1353, 1416 (2006) ("The congressional response was to open up the federal
forum as a bulwark against improper or opportunistic state-court oversight of the national market.").
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000) (authorizing
transfers "[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice").
24 See id. § 1407 (authorizing a "Judicial Panel
for Multidistrict Litigation" to consolidate actions in federal courts "for the convenience of parties and witnesses and...
[to] promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions"); Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (enforcing § 1407(a)'s requirement that actions "shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion
of... pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred").
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the class as a whole and the lawyers who purport to represent them.2
The same words, however, might have a very different meaning. They
might convey a kind of minimal performance standard broadly akin to
2
notions of ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal sphere "here, a concern that even unconflicted class counsel for a properly
composed class simply might do a bad job or might shirk responsibility by accepting an inadequate settlement so as to gain quickly at least
some modicum of a fee award from the litigation .2 In still another
permutation, "adequate representation" might speak to the personal
jurisdiction of the rendering court 8 over class members who otherwise lack "minimum contacts" with the forum-something thought to
afford due process only if, among other things, class members are adeof the Supreme Court
quately represented "at all times,"
9 in the words
in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts.2
When the most common basis for collateral attacks itself ranges
broadly, it should not surprise us that prescriptions for those attacks
should also diverge. Like the fictional household product "Shimmer"
touted in the 1970s on the comedy show Saturday Night Live, the concept of adequate representation purports to function today, one
might say, as both a floor wax and a dessert topping.30 We find the
encumbering of "adequate representation" with multiple meanings to
be similarly unpalatable. Unpacking the concept of adequate representation has the benefit of highlighting that its various meanings do
not have the same implications for collateral attacks. Allegations of an
inadequate class settlement warrant more narrow parameters for collateral attacks than, say, a structural conflict of interest that under-

25

See Samuel lssacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999

Sup. CT. REv. 337, 385 ("The key is that a supervising court must be assured at the
threshold stage of the litigation that there are no structural allegiances of class counsel
that would create incentives to favor one part of the class over another, or be biased
against seeking the best possible return to a defined subset of claims.").
26 On the analogy to ineffective assistance claims in habeas corpus litigation, see
Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 858 tbl., which summarizes the standard for ineffective
assistance in terms of "[s]ubstandard performance of counsel resulting in prejudice to
petitioner."
27 The potential for shirking, apart from any conflict of interest on class counsel's
part, remains a staple of the economic literature on class actions. See infra text accompanying notes 151-154.
28 Throughout this Article we use the terms "rendering court"
or "court of first
instance" to refer to the court that initially approved a class action settlement.
29 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985).
30 For a transcript of this comedy sketch, see Saturday Night Live Transcripts,
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/75/75ishimmer.phtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
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mines the legitimacy of the proceeding ab initio and regardless of the
outcome for the class. Yet the use of the same terminology for all
manner of representational defects allows even a claim of subpar performance to assume the mantle of a constitutional affront.
The "how" question speaks to the proper scope for collateral review. We urge a perspective that broadens the terms of the debate
and matches the scope of collateral review to the varying meanings of
adequate representation on functional rather than formalistic
grounds. The broadening consists of situating collateral review within
the array of other avenues for consideration of the adequate representation question. All forms of judicial review in the class action area
coexist with generally applicable tools, such as Rule 60(b),' malpractice litigation against class counsel, 32 and, of course, the right of direct
appeal from the class judgment pursuant to the normal rules of appellate procedure-something greatly facilitated by the Supreme Court's
2002 decision in Devlin v. Scardellelti33 to reject any requirement of
formal intervention as a prerequisite to appeal by an absent class
member.
Recent decades have witnessed an emerging conceptualization of
the court conducting direct review as a fiduciary for absent class
members.34 This fiduciary conception is a welcome advance, but it
remains incomplete. A fiduciary court suffers from a considerable informational disadvantage vis-A-vis the settling lawyers, joined arm-inarm in favor of their proposed deal. Commentators have suggested a
variety of approaches to address this informational disadvantage
within the direct review process itself,35 and we generally applaud
those efforts. The law of class actions would benefit further by viewing
the problems of direct review and collateral review as functionally re-

31FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (concerning relief from all manner of civil judgments in
the federal system).
32 For an argument in favor of expanded use of malpractice
liability with regard to
class counsel misconduct, see Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1074-89 (1996).
3 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (reversing the circuit court's ruling that an absent class
member lacked standing to appeal from district court approval of a class settlement for lack
of intervention).
34 Perhaps the leading case law articulation appears in Reynolds v. Beneficial
National Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.). See also Chris Brummer,
Note, Sharpeningthe Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review, and the Role of the Fiduciary
Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1042, 1062-67 (2004) (detailing the
elements ofjudicial fiduciary scrutiny).
35 See infra text accompanying notes 190-192.
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lated, thereby synching with the notion of a cohesive theory of classsettlement review that we offer here.
We urge a view that simultaneously accounts for the differing
meanings of inadequate representation, the fiduciary role of the court
on direct review, and the provision of a federal forum in CAFA for
class actions of national significance. Specifically, the latitude available for collateral attack should vary depending on whether the specific defect in the class representation is structural or performancebased. Structural defects, as we shall detail, warrant an approach
adapted from notions of issue preclusion. The focus should be on
whether the rendering court has considered and rejected the alleged
structural defect, not on who raised that defect-whether the class
member now positioned as the collateral-attack plaintiff, the defendant in its resistance to class certification, or the rendering court sua
sponte, as part of its fiduciary obligation. By contrast, the relevant inquiry for performance defects should cast preclusion more broadly by
focusing, in an adaptation of claim preclusion principles, on the availability of a full and fair opportunity to raise such defects in the rendering court. We explain how a previously overlooked difference in the
notice afforded to absent class members by the rendering court supports the intuitive difference between structural defects and performance defects as the basis for a collateral attack.
As to both sorts of defects, moreover, the status of the rendering
court, as one duly selected pursuant to congressional choice-as in
CAFA-or one chosen simply by the dealmaking lawyers, should affect
the latitude available for collateral attacks. Simply put, greater preclusion should flow from use of the congressionally preferred forum as
compared to the potentially anomalous court in which the dealmakers
otherwise might wish to "park" a desired deal. As a formal matter, review of structural defects and performance defects should follow the
framework summarized above. The additional nuance consists of the
recognition that CAFA, in combination with the existing law of the
Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), effectively channels collateral attacks on
class settlements in the federal judicial system back to the rendering
federal court. The federal court thus would be positioned to rule on
the alleged structural or performance defect in the posture of ruling
on the propriety of its own previous conduct of the federal class action
litigation-a posture that will tend toward a modest additional disinclination toward collateral attack in practical operation. This is entirely appropriate, in our view. Cutbacks in the latitude available for
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the anomalous certifying court, as in CAFA, logically warrant circumscription of the latitude available for collateral attack.
This Article proceeds in three Parts that track the "where," "what,"
and "how" of class-settlement review: forum selection, the meanings
of adequate representation, and the scope ofjudicial review on both a
direct and a collateral basis. We close with some more speculative
thoughts on how the ongoing debates over collateral attacks might
play out in ways that would reinforce the effects of CAFA on the relationship of federal and state courts and on the structure of the class
action plaintiffs' bar.
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE ANOMALOUS COURT

CAFA might seem an odd place to start a discussion of classsettlement review, for the statute devotes little discussion to that subject. 37 Properly framed, however, the central problem addressed by
CAFA sheds light on the landscape in which both direct review and
collateral review of class settlements operate. We begin, in Section A,
with a broad-brush account of the developments that brought this
landscape into being and then turn to CAFA's prescription directed to
the class certification determination rather than to class-settlement review. Section B then explains how the concern underlying CAFA
stands to unfold today with respect to class settlements, taking into account both strategic considerations and the law governing the relationship between federal and state courts. Section C reflects more
broadly on the problem of regulatory mismatch presented by the postCAFA world.
A. National Markets and the Anomalous Court
Forum matters. It may appear banal to observe that the court in
which a case is situated, the rules and substantive laws that operate,

36 As to the effects on the plaintiffs' bar, we find ourselves in broad agreement

with the assessment offered in Howard M. Erichson, CAFA s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, Part III (2008), which suggests that CAFA has encouraged
class action attorneys to "alter[] both the nature of their lawsuits and the places where
they bring them."
37 CAFA requires the federal courts to provide notice concerning proposed
class
settlements to appropriate public regulatory bodies, enabling them to comment on the
fairness of the deal. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (Supp. V 2005). CAFA also speaks to judicial
review of proposed class settlements in the form of coupon distribution to consumers
in the class. See id. § 1712.
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and even the presiding judge all have important effects on the prospects of a case. As much as the choice of forum has become a signal
issue in recent class action law, it is worth noting at the onset that this
was not always the case.
The modern class action has its antecedents in the need for coordinated disposition of confined conduct.3
Thus, for example, an
early challenge by the citizens of York to upstream contamination of
their river 9 highlighted the joint nature of the claimed harm and the
impossibility of disaggregated resolution. Such cases illustrated the "if
as to one, then as to all" feature that is the hallmark of what was formerly termed a "true" class action. Such actions would pose no question of forum. The case would be filed in the equity court for the affected jurisdiction, plain and simple.
So long as the class action continued to be used primarily to challenge confined conduct, the same pattern would persist. Whatever
the difficulties in Hansbery v. Lee, 40 forum was not one of them. The
case would challenge residential segregation in the South Side of Chicago, and either the state or the federal courts in Illinois would resolve the matter. Similarly, a landmark case such as Brown v. Board of
Education41 would emerge from the federal court in Topeka, Kansas,
or, as with its companion case from Wilmington, Delaware, from a local state court.42 But even in such landmark cases, rich with national
significance, the immediate challenge would be local. Whether the
subject matter was school desegregation, employment practices at a
local steel mill, or voting rights, the forum for litigation followed from
the local nature of the immediate actors responsible for the claimed harms.
This pattern began to change with the advent of antitrust and securities class actions, a trend that would accelerate with the rise of
consumer claims and mass harm cases. It is, therefore, no coincidence that an elaborated law of class actions should have emerged in
this country in the twentieth century. The period saw not only the rise

3

For an excellent historical treatment of the roots of the modern class action, see

STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS AcTION (1987). See also Robert G. Bone, Personaland Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the Histoty of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) (reviewing
YEAZELL, supra).
39 Mayor of York v. Pilkington,
(1737) 25 Eng. Rep. 946.
40 311 U.S. 32
(1940).
41

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42
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of the modern class action, but also-arguably, its antecedent-the
emergence of integrated national markets for standardized goods and
services. National markets for undifferentiated products gave rise to a
potential for harm on a mass scale, to which both class actions in private litigation and the modern regulatory state in the public sphere
43
form the principal legal responses. National markets also broadened
the fora within which a given plaintiff seeking to litigate a dispute
concerning an undifferentiated, nationally marketed product might
attempt to sue. So it is that, even in a world of conventional individual
lawsuits, the broadened-if only modestly-array for forum selection
contributed to the need for forum-selection rules to define where a
case could be brought and for choice of law principles to enable
the
44
forum court to select the substantive law to govern the dispute.
Now, add to the picture aggregate procedure, layered on top of
national markets. The mid-twentieth century saw the emergence of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the mimicking of
its language by state counterpart rules in the vast majority ofjurisdictions. 45 This near-nationwide recognition of the class action in its
modern form had the unanticipated effect of broadening further the
array of potential fora. For a class action, class counsel need only
name in the complaint a few representatives of the proposed classjust one is often sufficient-in order to assert authority to litigate on
behalf
of a nationwide group comprised of similarly situated per46
sons. Where both the disputed conduct and the would-be members
of the class extend broadly, the range of potential fora expands commensurately. The range of possible locations for suit in a given instance might well extend to the various federal district courts in addition to their state trial-level counterparts spread across the nation.
This practice received its formal approval in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
4.3 On the intellectual tension between the plaintiffs' bar and supporters
of the
New Deal administrative state, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS
ch. 4 (2007). On the array of difficulties presented today by the parallel existence of
class action litigation and public administrative regulation, see Richard A. Nagareda,
ClassActions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1014659.
44 For more extensive discussion of the problems presented by national
markets
for choice of law analysis, see Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choiceof Law after the Class Action FairnessAct, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1839 (2006).
45 The various state rules are compiled in LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE
CLASS AcTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2000).
46 The familiar requirements of commonality and typicality in Rule 23(a) embody
this notion. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (2)-(3).
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Shutts, where the nationwide class action was born of the minimal
process requirements of notice and an ability to opt out, coupled with
adequate representation. 47 But Shutts would ask only whether a nationwide forum could be constituted; it did not ask whether the chosen forum was the dominant one, or even one that was particularly
suitable. It would not be long before sophisticated lawyers for both
would-be plaintiff classes and defendants would begin to discern and
to deploy strategically this expanded range of potential fora.
CAFA responds to only one variant of such strategic uses of forum.
CAFA amends the federal diversity jurisdiction statute to make it
much easier for defendants to remove to federal court proposed nationwide class actions involving high-stakes, state law claims originally
filed in state court.
There are a variety of alternative technical requirements for removal under CAFA that, taken as a whole, seek to
define the boundaries between litigation of local concern and litigation premised on generalized conduct in a national market. 49 These
boundaries may be imprecise-and they may well give rise to a new
round ofjockeying for advantage in litigation-but the basic contours
correspond to goods and services directed by national firms to national markets.
The change in forum authorized by CAFA is more than just cosmetic. CAFA supporters sought to blunt the strategy of class counsel
to frame proposed nationwide classes so as to inhibit the removal of
broad-reaching class actions to federal court and thereby to exploit
particular state courts thought exceptionally amenable to class certification. 50 CAFA authorizes a change in the forum that shall rule on
the class certification question precisely in order to drive a change in
result on that question in some instances. On the flip side, CAFA pro47 472

U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) (Supp. V 2005) (providing for federal diversity
jurisdiction over class actions with more than $5 million in controversy and minimal diversity of citizenship).
49 See id. § 1332 (d) (3)-(4) (carving out from the broadened grant
of diversity jurisdiction those class actions of local concern).
N)The Senate Judiciary Committee Report discusses the strategies of removalproofing used under the pre-CAFA federal diversity statute and cites examples of state
court class certifications described as out of line with the prevailing approach of the
federal courts. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 10-27 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
11-27. The Committee Report, however, was written after the bill had been signed into
law, a feature that compromises the utility of the Report as a guide to congressional
thought processes in the pre-enactment debates. See, e.g., Abrego Abrego v. Dow
Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Senate Report was "issued ten days after CAFA's passage into law").
48
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vides potential class counsel in a nationwide case with protection from
copycat class actions filed by local lawyers in friendly home jurisdictions. 5 Those actions are now subject to removal to federal court as
well. Oddly enough, then, the removal power given to defendants to
combat class certification operates, in part, to protect incumbent class
counsel already in federal court. The first effect was the dominant
concern of the active champions of the proposed legislation; the second is in the nature of an unintended, but significant, effect.
Framed in its most plausible light, the core justification for CAFA
sounds less in categorical, federal-versus-state terms and more in the
creation of a centralized power to control the range of potential fora
for class actions concerning national-market behavior. Writing for the
Seventh Circuit prior to CAFA, Judge Frank Easterbrook captured the
essential problem as one of the anomalous court-the court inclined
to exercise its discretion in the interpretation or application of
broadly shared procedural requirements so as to yield class certification, even though the vast majority of courts in the federal system, in
other states, and perhaps even within the same state would not certify.
As Judge Easterbrook noted, "if one nationwide class is certified, then
all the no-certification decisions fade into insignificance. A single
positive trumps all the negatives. ' ' 53 National markets and the authori-

51 The mechanism here consists of the combination of CAFA (to get
the various
competing class actions into federal court) and the existing authority of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (to consolidate related federal-court actions in a single district). See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 162
(2006) (predicting that "the enactment of CAFA will reduce the incidence of... [reverse auctions in class settlements] by forcing many class actions into federal courts,
where the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation will consolidate like claims in a single jurisdiction").
52 CAFA supporters accurately
observed that:
The reason for th[e] dramatic increase in state court class actions cannot be
found in variations in class actions rules; after all, the rules governing the decision whether cases may proceed as class actions are basically the same in
federal and state courts-and, of course, they are the same within states, i.e.,
the same in "magnet" jurisdictions such as Madison County and St. Clair
County, Illinois, as they are in more easily accessible jurisdictions such as Cook
County, Illinois.

S. REP. No. 109-14, at 13, reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13.
53 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
766-67
(7th Cir. 2003). By way of illustration: "Even if just one judge in ten believes that a
nationwide class is lawful, then if the plaintiffs file in ten different states the probability
that at least one will certify a nationwide class is 65% (0.9' = 0.349). Filing in 20 states
produces an 88% probability of national class certification (0.920 = 0.122)." Id. at 767.
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zation of class actions by nearly all procedural regimes nationwide, together, had the unintended effect of empowering anomalous courtsthose state courts characterized in CAFA rhetoric as magnets for nationwide class actions 4 and seemingly located, as one of us has ventured, in "any county named after a president that's by a body of water. '' 55CAFA
expands the diversityjurisdiction of the federal courts to
turn this phenomenon on its head, effectively enabling the defendant,
if she wishes, to use a change of forum to empower the negatives
on
56
the class certification question to trump the anomalous positive.

The problem of the anomalous court explains why observations about the lack of "empirical evidence supporting the belief that state and federal court differ generally in
their treatment of class actions" are largely beside the point with respect to CAFA.
Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action
Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 593 (2006).
For present purposes, we put aside the debate prompted by Bridgestone/Firestone
concerning the authority, if any, that a federal court has to enjoin in state court the
same proposed nationwide class action that the federal court has declined to certify
under Rule 23. Other courts have concluded that no such authority exists under current law, reasoning that the federal court's decision to decline certification is not
properly regarded as issue preclusive with respect even to the same proposed class in a
state court. Rather, the state court retains discretion, within the wide berth of federal
constitutional due process, to apply even an identically phrased state class action rule
in a manner different from the federal court. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[O]ur interpretation of Rule 23 is not binding on the Louisiana courts."); J.R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996) ("While Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 is modeled on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules, and federal decisions are viewed
as persuasive authority regarding the construction of the Texas class action rules, . . . a
Texas court might well exercise this discretion in a different manner."). But see Tobias
Barrington Wolff, FederalJurisdictionand Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035 (2008) (urging recognition of federal injunctive power in
this scenario); cf ALI DRAFT PRINCIPLES OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note tt, §
2.11 cmts. b, d (urging state courts to afford comity to the federal class decertification
decision, but also noting special situations in which that decision might have issuepreclusive effect).
54 S. REP. No. 109-14, at 22, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3 at 22; see also John H.
Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case Out of It. . . in State
Court, 25 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 155 (2001) (describing how "class action lawyers
are bringing a large number of cases in a small number of state courts that have become 'magnets' for interstate class actions and that thus exercise a widely disproportionate role in adjudicating national disputes").
55 Roundtable, Class Action Fairness Act, NAT'L L.J., May 16, 2005, at
18, 20 (remarks of Samuel Issacharoff). One topic yet to be explored systematically in the empirical literature concerns the relationship between the anomalous-court problem and
the use in pertinent state systems of elected, rather than appointed,judges.
" To be sure, the federal forum favored by CAFA does not eliminate
entirely the
potential for divergent results on class certification. Federal courts can disagree over
the interpretation and application of Rule 23, just as they can for any other source of
federal law. Still, CAFA supporters plausibly regarded the degree of divergence within
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From the plaintiffs' perspective, CAFA empowers those class action lawyers who are willing and able to play for national stakes.
Oddly, the presence of anomalous courts-both state and, occasionally, federa57 -served to compromise the willingness and ability of
class counsel to invest in large cases and to resist early settlement demands, for fear that their investments would be undercut by an alternative class action. CAFA alters the strategic dynamics by trusting federal courts to police the legitimacy of class counsel's representation of
the absent class members in a fashion analogous to the role of the
lead institutional plaintiff under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 51 One can see CAFA's unintended empowering of nationally oriented plaintiffs' lawyers as the counterpart
to the PSLRA's unintended empowering of securities plaintiffs' law
firms-chiefly Milberg Weiss, before it divided into two firms-that
already had long-standing relationships with the sorts of large institutional investors preferred as lead plaintiffs by the latter statute, or
were best positioned to establish such relationships based on a track
record of success in such cases.
B. The Strategy andJudicialFederalismof Class Settlements After CAFA
CAFA's treatment of the anomalous court nonetheless remains
incomplete. Although the statute expands federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions, it leaves intact the customary power of removal
at the discretion of the defendant." This feature of CAFA gives rise to
a troubling potential for the anomalous-court problem to persist, not
with respect to class certification in the face of the defendant's opposi-

the federal system as substantially less than the divergence across all trial-level courts in
the nation. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 53-54, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3 at 49-51
(asserting that the levels of abuse are not even comparable). In addition, the authority
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to consolidate in a single federal district court civil lawsuits of all sorts concerning the same underlying matter, 28 U.S.C. §
1407 (Supp. V 2005), reduces dramatically the prospect for multiple shots at class certification across different federal districts.
57 See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 283 (7th
Cir. 2002) (overturning the approval of a class settlement by a federal court in an alleged reverse auction).
58 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78

(2000)).

59 See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation
and Its Lawyers:

Changes During the First
Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1515 tbl.3
(2006) (noting that Milberg Weiss enjoyed a 27.4% share of the market for representation of plaintiffs in securities class actions during the immediate post-PSLRA period).
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2000) (cross-referencing the usual
statute for removal,
28 U.S.C. § 1446).
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tion but, rather, for certification and settlement approval at the defendant's behest, in tandem with class counsel.6'
Well before CAFA, the class action literature described the potential for a "reverse auction," whereby a defendant in search of a class
settlement identifies plaintiffs' lawyers willing to join in seeking judicial approval for a deal such that the defendant may purchase the
preclusion of class members' claims on the cheap. 62 As the term "reverse auction" suggests, this form of collusion holds for the defendant
the tantalizing promise of turning competition for litigation control
within the plaintiffs' bar against the interests of class members themselves.
By aggregating small claims, class actions offer enterprising plaintiffs' counsel the benefits of leveraging the incremental stakes of individual plaintiffs into a worthwhile undertaking."" The key to such leveraging is the reduced transaction costs in "opt-out" class actions that
flow from not having to find and contract with the numerous smallvalue claim holders. But, as in all leveraged endeavors, with opportunity comes risk. The lack of a contractual basis for representation
means that, until a class is certified and that certification is exclusive,
new class counsel can emerge, claiming-usually in a different
court-to be the true champions of the class. This form of competition among plaintiffs' law firms is itself expanded as a result of national markets. Not surprisingly, then, a world in which undifferentiated goods and services are marketed nationwide is also one in which
claims arising from that activity might be pursued by a roster of plaintiffs' law firms that is similarly broad.
Settling class counsel collude with the defendant in the reverseauction scenario in order to garner some manner of a fee award-if
only from a reduced class-settlement carcass-rather than nothing at
6l

See Wolff, supra note 53, at 2126 ("The excision of absent-plaintiff removal...

eliminated the most direct mechanism by which class members could have sought protection from collusion .... ").
62 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1354 (1995) (describing a tendency toward "structural collusion"
in mass tort class actions).
63As the Supreme Court has noted,
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual
to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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all, in the face of class representation by rivals within the plaintiffs'
bar. The connection to the array of potential fora is this: collusion
might extend not only to the obvious agreement to the classsettlement terms but also to the selection of an approving court from
among the same nationwide array of potential fora as existed for contested class certifications pre-CAFA. In its most unabashed form, the
usual move is to seek class certification and settlement approval in a
state court where class counsel are familiar members of the local bar
and have long-standing professional relationships with elected local
judges.
Unlike CAFA's main focus on state law claims, moreover, the potential for use of the anomalous settlement-approving court-to be
sure, a potential that existed prior to CAFA and that remains unchanged-is not similarly confined in subject matter. State courts are
courts of general subject matter jurisdiction and thus, broadly speaking, can settle all manner of civil claims, save the small set of those for
which federal law provides exclusive federal subject matter jurisdic64
tion. And even for federal law claims as to which the federal courts
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction by statute, the Supreme
Court has understood such jurisdiction narrowly. If it wishes as a matter of its own preclusion principles, a state court may serve as a forum
for settlement of such claims short of adjudication on the merits, in
tandem with related claims under state law-at least, unless Congress
specifies otherwise by clear language in the grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction.65

This then presents an initial paradox. Collateral attack could be a
way to rein in rogue actors. After all, if colluding class counsel and
defendants can go searching the land for the welcoming forum in
which to park their settlement, then the ability to challenge the consequences in a subsequent action elsewhere should provide a safety
valve against improper conduct. Indeed, a review of the literature extolling the virtues of subsequent challenges to class action settlements

See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (2000).
65 See Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Epstein, 516
U.S. 367, 381-82 (1996) (holding
that the exclusive grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts over "actions.., brought to enforce any liability or duty created by" the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000), does not warrant the withholding of full faith and
credit from a Delaware state court judgment approving a class settlement that encompassed such claims, along with Delaware corporate law claims).
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welyields a nearly unalloyed picture of saintly second fora, providing
66
come shelter from the ravages of abusive class settlements.
But why should we assume that the initial forum is corrupt and
the second forum beknighted? 67 Or, to put the point another way,
what if the second forum is the product of the same type of forum
shopping, only this time on behalf of an improperly motivated attack
on a well-considered class settlement? Or, even more simply stated:
what if the forum for the collateral attack is the outlier, contrary to the
assumption that the forum that approved the class settlement is necessarily complicit in wrongdoing? Seen in this light, collateral attacks
themselves do not avoid the problem of the anomalous court; rather,
they can replicate the problem in a new procedural posture. Just as
the array of potential fora invites proponents of collusive class settlements to seek the anomalous approving forum, the same array invites
those hostile to the deal to seek the forum anomalously inclined to allow the collateral challenger some extraordinary gain by threatening
to blow up the entire settlement. The stock in trade for this maneuver
is to claim inadequate class representation and thereby to deny preclusive effect to the deal. Further, because the collateral challenge
can be had anywhere a class member may be found, collateral attacks
on classjudgments differ in kind from other forms of collateral attack.
For example, collateral challenge by writ of habeas corpus, in a federal forum for habeas litigation concerning a state criminal conviction, is tightly circumscribed by federal statute.

W

13.

For arguments in favor of liberalized collateral review, see sources cited supra note

M For a summary of the arguments between "preclusionists" who favor the conclusiveness of initial court review and "constitutionalists" who support a broad individual
right to collateral challenge, see Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 828-41.
As the Supreme Court has explained, Congress designed the federal habeas
statute precisely to disable a search for the anomalous court to overturn a state criminal conviction:
Congress added the limiting clause-"within their respective jurisdictions" to the habeas statute [28 U.S.C. § 2241] in 1867 to avert the "inconvenient
[and] potentially embarrassing" possibility that "everyjudge anywhere [could]
issue the Great Writ on behalf of applicants far distantly removed from the
courts whereon they sat." . . . Accordingly, with respect to habeas petitions
"designed to relieve an individual from oppressive confinement," the traditional rule has always been that the Great Writ is "issuable only in the district
of confinement."
RtImsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (quoting Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S.
611, 617-18 (1961)).
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The problem, then, is that the search for an anomalous forum
might allow collateral attacks on class settlements to bust not only bad
class judgments, but also good ones. Here, again, competition among
plaintiffs' law firms for control of a given subject area of litigation has
strategic implications. One theme in the case law on collateral attacks
consists of some underlying rivalry between plaintiffs' law firms to
gain, or to wrest from one another, the power to tender class memThe upshot of a successful collateral atbers' claims for settlement.
tack is, at the very least, to empower the plaintiff's counsel to negotiMore broadly, the
ate a separate settlement for her client.
establishment of a forum prepared to regard the class settlement as
constitutionally defective presents a credible threat to unravel the
binding effect of the deal overall-something with the potential to induce the defendant in search of peace to negotiate for the elimination
of that threat with the rival plaintiffs' law firm that mounted the collateral attack.
The law ofjudicial federalism-in curricular terms, the law of federal courts-also influences strategic choices in forum selection. For
example, the availability of the All-Writs Act and the Anti-Injunction
Act means that a federal court judgment approving a class settlement
carries with it a power on the part of that court to enjoin state court
litigation that would challenge the preclusive effect of the resulting
judgment. 0 In practical effect, the existing law ofjudicial federalism
disempowers the ability of an anomalous state court to authorize a collateral attack on a federal court class judgment. The particular federal court that originally approved the class settlement is the same
court that stands to rule, through the vehicle of the settlingdefendant's motion to enjoin the state court collateral attack, on subsequent challenges to the adequacy of representation afforded to the class.

69 See

Nagareda, supra note 13, at 347 (drawing on case law to illustrate "the potential for the law to unleash competitive forces to discipline the adequacy of class representation and, for that matter, the oversight afforded by the courts themselves").
70 As a technical matter, the injunction flows from the authority of the
federal
court to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (2000). The
general prohibition in the Anti-Injunction Act against federal court injunctions of state
court proceedings is turned off by the exception in the Act for injunctions to "protect
or effectuate" a federal judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). See, e.g., In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) ("Since
there are federal judgments that approve some of the settlements and that control the
further litigation of the appellants' cause of action,... the injunction was and is not
precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2283.").
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Federal injunctive power is doubly attractive for the settling parties. Simply as a predictive matter, the federal court that previously
certified the class and approved the class settlement is unlikely to be
receptive to a contention that it somehow botched its analysis of adequate representation. In addition, federal injunctive power eliminates
the need for the defendant to assert claim preclusion as a defense in
the state court collateral attack, with the attendant risk that the state
court might issue ajudgment rejecting the defense that then would be
entitled to "full faith and credit" from otherjudicial systems across the
country. 7' This is well-understood by all sophisticated litigants and
explains the increasing preference for federal court as the forum in
which to settle large-scale class actions, even independent of CAFA's
conferral of diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, the most contested issues
in this area of law concern the moment at which federal courts may
begin to exercise their injunctive power to protect their jurisdiction
over consideration of a pending settlement, before absent class members have received notice of the proposed settlement 7 '2-aprerequisite
forjurisdiction under most areas of substantive law. 3

71

See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1986) (holding,

in a non-class action case, that even a mistaken rejection by a state court of a claimpreclusion defense predicated on an earlier federal judgment is entitled to full faith
and credit). The quoted language stems from the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, with regard to the effect of a state court judgment in the courts of a sister state, and from the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (2000), with respect to the effect in federal courts.
72 After canvassing the case law on this question, the Ninth
Circuit recently declined to enjoin state court litigation. The court noted that
none of the considerations that have induced courts to issue injunctions despite the strictures of the Anti-Injunction Act was present. This was not an
MDL case; discovery was not complete; no class settlement was imminent, in
fact, as far as the record shows no serious settlement progress has been made;
and, finally, there was no evidence of collusive procedures, reverse auction, or
otherwise, even assuming that the existence of those would justify an injunction of state proceedings.
Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 07-55505, 2008 WL 1868993 (9th Cir.
Apr. 29, 2008).
73 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (holding that
absent class members must "receive notice plus an opporttnity to be heard and participate in the litigation"). Some areas of law are subject to nationwide jurisdiction in
federal court. For example, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear all
patent appeals, as well as appeals from the Court of International Trade and the Court
of Federal Claims. United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 809, 827 n.9 (7th Cir. 2003).
Other statutes vest federal authorities with the power to issue nationwide service of
process, effectively extending their jurisdictional reach nationwide, as with the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (2000). Finally, several statutes create exclusive
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The same injunctive power does not attend a state courtjudgment
approving a class settlement. Collateral attacks on the binding effect
of such a judgment may proceed in the courts of other states (or, for
that matter, in federal court), such that the problem of the anomalous
court remains unabated. As a general matter, the rendering state
court has no power to enjoin such collateral attacks, or at least none
recognized by case law to date. 4 Rather, the forum selected for the
collateral attack stands to rule on challenges to the preclusive effect of
the class judgment under the auspices of a determination of the full
faith and credit owed to that judgment. A constitutionally defective
judgment is not entitled to preclusive effect in another forum, 75 for
even the rendering forum could not properly afford the judgment
such effect.
CAFA, however, alters the mix. The statutory allocation to federal
courts of more-or-less exclusive power over suits of national dimension
creates distinct rules for national market cases. For cases of national
dimension, the anomalous state court threatens to impose an idiosyncratic and likely rent-seeking tax on the activities of the national market. CAFA disempowers that strategy by placing the regulatory power
of national-market litigation in the courts of the national government.
The paradox is that an unalloyed power of collateral attack allows the
same aberrant courts to return to the scene, only this time in the guise
of rejecting the work of the federal courts rather than in the posture
of fashioning the litigation in the first instance.
Further, and borrowing from the analogy initially developed by
William Rubenstein between collateral attacks on class settlements

federal court subject matter jurisdiction, although that is independent of the notice
issue. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006) (admiralty and maritime jurisdiction), § 1338
(patents and copyrights), § 1346(b) (United States as defendant in tort actions),
§ 1351 (foreign consul or member of foreign mission as defendant), & § 1355 (action
for recovery of fine, penalty, or forfeiture under federal legislation).
74 The one narrow exception consists of state court class judgments
concerning a
limited fund, by analogy to the well-established authority of state courts in proceedings
in rem to enjoin litigation elsewhere concerning the res. See Donovan v. City of Dallas,
377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964) (noting that, for in rem or quasi in rem proceedings, "the
state or federal court having custody of such property has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed"); Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 136 (1941) (noting that "where a
state court first acquires control of the res, the federal courts are disabled from exercising any power over it, by injunction or otherwise").
75 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 388
(1996) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that a "state-court judgment generally is not entitled to full faith and credit unless it satisfies the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause").
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and habeas review,'76 the availability of collateral review does not necessarily empower any court in any jurisdiction to exercise that power.
So, for example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate that
judgments may be revisited in light of new knowledge under the strict
guidelines of Rule 60(b), 7 which we shall discuss further in Part III.
Unlike collateral challenges that are shopped around the country in
search of a hospitable court, however, a Rule 60(b) motion for relief
from judgment must be brought in the court that rendered the judgment. This removes the ability to scour the countryside for a friendly
court to attack a class settlement or even a litigated class judgment.
To the critics of class action settlements, however, the prospect of
challenge in the rendering court is likely unappealing, for it effectively would make impotent the claim that the rendering court was incompetent, malevolent, or worse.
In circumstances where class actions may be shopped for certification from forum to forum by plaintiffs' counsel, or where they may be
parked for settlement by the joint undertakings of defendants and
plaintiffs' counsel, a rule disfavoring collateral attacks and forcing
claims into the difficult mold of Rule 60(b) may overly empower forum shopping at the expense of fairness. But where forum selection is
undertaken pursuant to congressional policy rather than strategic behavior on the part of the dealmaking lawyers, a procedural regime
that would allow any jurisdiction-particularly, a craftily selected state
court jurisdiction-to appoint itself as the agent of review has no
compelling logic. To the contrary, granting greater protection against
collateral challenge to cases properly filed in federal court-what the
AIA effectively does-serves to cure a gap in the CAFA framework: it
would afford defendants who prefer a quick-and-dirty class settlement
in state court less protection from collateral challenge, something that
strikes us as an eminently deserved outcome.
Taken together, the law of judicial federalism, the rivalries in the
market for litigation control, and the allocation of removal power
under CAFA help to frame the first of the challenges posed for a cohesive theory of class-settlement review. Such a theory should do two
things at once with respect to forum selection: it should discourage
the use of the anomalous forum for both class-settlement approval
and collateral attack.

76

See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 796 ("Habeas therefore can serve as a foil for

the class action finality debate.").
77 FED. R. Cv. P.
60(b).
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C. Regulatory Mismatch
CAFA-related forum difficulties are part of a much larger structural problem that arises where there is economic conduct of a scale
greater than the body that seeks to review it. We term this effect a
"regulatory mismatch" to convey the idea of local actors trying to impose their will on economic activity beyond the scope of the government that has constituted them. Simply put, a regulatory mismatch
may occur whenever the authority charged with overseeing some economic activity has jurisdiction that is smaller than the conduct to be
regulated. It is difficult, for example, to produce cars for the national
market yet also to be subject to inconsistent state tort liability for
product design. If Ohio were to.require self-locking seatbelts and
Indiana were to prohibit them, a manufacturer could find itself liable
in either state as cars predictably move in interstate commerce. At
some point, both the manufacturers and the states would have to look
to federal regulation to set the appropriate standards and, presumably, preempt inconsistent state law. 7' This is an extraordinarily complicated area of law that, in the form of preemption claims, has come
to dominate a significant portion of the Supreme Court's civil
caseload.
Among the many problems presented is that congressional efforts to fix the liability standards for nationwide conduct typically ignore the compensatory and deterrent ambitions of the state law
that may be displaced.
This is a broad topic that pushes beyond what can be addressed in
this Article. Nonetheless, it is critical to recognize that CAFA is a partial attempt to fix a problem of misalignment between the conduct
that is subject to regulation and the jurisdictional reach of the reviewing court. While its statutory structure is complicated, CAFA proceeds
from a core intuition that cases of national market scope should be in
federal court-the best approximation available for aggregate over78

This argument is developed at length in Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 22.

79 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008)
(declaring the preemptive

effect of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) premarket approval of a Class Ill medical device); Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007) (analyzing the preemptive effect of Federal Trade Commission regulation of "light" cigarettes), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (No. 07-0562); Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467
F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the relationship between FDA regulation of prescription drug labeling and the fraud exception to state regulatory compliance defense
in tort), cert. granted sub. nom. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 31 (2007) (No.
06-1498); Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WIL 3041078 (Vt. 2006) (discussing the
preemptive effect of FDA approval of prescription drug labeling), cert. granted, 128 S.
Ct. 11118 (2008) (No. 06-1249).
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sight of economic activity of a national ambit. A more complete statutory framework would have provided clear choice of law rules for such
cases, as well as a substantive law framework that would resist balkanizing pressures on national market conduct. But the substantive law
limitations of congressional intervention into the litigation of national
market claims is yet another topic beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather, our concern here is the jurisdictional element in CAFA's distinct treatment of common law claims arising from national-market
conduct.
Leaving aside the complicated motivations behind CAFA, and also
putting aside some of the difficulties in the statutory definitions of national-market cases, CAFA emerges as a partial fix to the problem of
state-level regulation of national-market conduct, particularly where
the state norms of conduct conflict. Although less developed, the
same argument could be advanced for cases subject to consolidation
by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL). While such
consolidations consist of cases already in the federal court system, the
purpose of MDL consolidation in a single federal district court is to
realize aggregate efficiencies for cases of broad sweep. MDL consolidation does not vest federal courts with additional subject matter jurisdiction, or even with the power to try all the consolidated cases.80
But each statute represents a congressional recognition, even if only
partial, that individually or collectively filed cases transcend their immediate jurisdictional boundaries.
Understood against the backdrop of regulatory mismatches, CAFA
(and to a lesser extent the MDL statute) speaks directly to the "where"
issue of the relation between state and federal courts for nationalmarket cases. As developed further in Part III, congressional allocation of decision-making authority in national-market cases to federal
courts also has direct implications for the form of review-and the extent of preclusion-available in different fora.
II.

THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF ADEQUATE CLASS REPRESENTATION

The preceding Part framed the "where" question surrounding judicial review of class settlements, analyzing where, among the potential fora, direct and collateral review might respectively occur. This
Part turns to the "what" question for such review-namely, what the
80 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.
26, 28
(1998) (holding that a district court cannot itself try a case transferred to it by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
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reviewing court asks with respect to a proposed class settlement or a
subsequent effort to challenge its preclusive effect. Independent of
the forum in which the challenge is lodged or the procedural form of
the challenge (to be addressed in the next Part), there is the substantive question of what may be raised as a bar to the preclusive effect of
a class action settlement.
One component of the answer to this question is easy enough to
state under current doctrine. Since Hansbeny, the law of class actions
has embraced the bedrock proposition that adequate class representation is a constitutional due process prerequisite to a binding class-wide
judgment."' What "adequate representation" actually means in the
class action setting beyond this high level of generality, however, is far
less easy to state in a single breath. The concept of adequacy clearly
concerns the role of the class representative and, more significantly,
the role of class counsel in carrying out their respective representative
duties in the litigation. Both constitutional doctrine and Rule 23 use
the term "adequate representation" to signify this important feature of
representative litigation. Nonetheless, the exact parameters of adequacy remain surprisingly ill defined8 2
The central observation in this Part is that current doctrine under
both the Constitution and Rule 23 has loaded the concept of adequate representation with multiple meanings, oftentimes in conflict
with each other. Adequacy at various points encompasses no less than
the structure of the class representation, the performance of class
counsel with regard to the class-settlement terms and, often, the personal jurisdiction of the rendering court over absent class members.
Because any process of settlement involves allocation of the joint gains
from peace-gains that do not inherently belong to one side or the
other-the gradations of settlement quality cannot possibly present
questions of constitutional magnitude. Similarly, the Constitution
seems an unlikely source of review for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, something that is easily waived under Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and readily satisfied under Shutts for absent
class members. Instead, we begin by distinguishing situations where
due process brooks no class action structured along the lines now said
to be binding from situations that involve allegations more in the na81

See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) ("[M]embers of a class not pre-

sent as parties ... may be bound by the judgment where they are ... adequately represented by parties who are present.").
82

See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 805 (describing the array of lower court deci-

sions as "rais[ing] as many questions as the), answer").
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ture of ordinary error-where a permissibly structured class nonetheless receives what a disenchanted plaintiff later characterizes as a raw
deal. Indeed, as will be elaborated, one much-debated federal appellate decision 3 actually manages to match the broadest latitude for collateral attacks with the aspect of adequate representation that least
demands such inquiry.
This Part will first elaborate upon what the law of class actions has
come to understand as a structural defect. It will then turn to the distinct meaning of adequate representation as a performance standard
focused on the settlement terms negotiated by class counsel. Finally,
it will discuss adequate representation as a component of personal jurisdiction where absent class members lack minimum contacts with
the rendering forum.
A. StructuralDefects
One meaning of adequate representation concerns the structure
of representation for the class. "Representation" here encompasses
both the relationship of class members to one another (a potential
source of intraclass conflicts of interest) and the relationship between
class counsel and the class as a whole (a potential source of attorneyclient conflicts). We discuss these two forms of conflicts in turn, explaining the significance of the focus on "structural" matters.
1. Intraclass Conflicts
By its terms, Rule 23(a)(4) speaks to intraclass conflicts, conditioning class certification on a judicial determination that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class., 8 4 The straightforward objective is to enable the class representative to protect the interests of the absent class members in the litigation simply by protecting her own self-interest therein. Much of the
case law interprets this requirement formalistically-in tandem with
the Rule 23(a) (3) inquiry into the "typicality" of the class representative-to ask whether the named individuals at the head of the class are
identical in all relevant concerns to the rest of the class.
In reality, the concern is otherwise. The issue is whether the
newly constructed collective entity-the class-is a proper stand-in for

83

Stephenson v. Dow Chern. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd by an equally

divided Courl, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4).
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the interests of the individual class members. In significant part, this
inquiry casts attention to the adequacy of class counsel, for class
members often will have little incentive or ability to monitor the
prosecution of their collective claims. We shall turn to class counsel
momentarily. But in significant part, the question of the typicality and
adequacy of the representation awkwardly frames an important insight
about whether the objectives of the class members are truly aligned.
Here, the insight is that no representative, no matter how capable or
faithful, can adequately represent a class comprised of persons whose
interests in the litigation diverge. No agent, in other words, can adequately serve multiple principals when the interests of the principals
themselves conflict.
The hard question concerning intraclass conflicts asks which conflicts should matter-which conflicts, in other words, call into question the sense of unified objectives so as to defeat the ability to recognize an "entity" shaped by common purpose, as recognized by David
Shapiro.
Framed this way, the conflict inquiry asks what divisions
should render the class representation so defective in structure as to
rise to the level of a constitutional dereliction. We first explain how a
conception of class actions focused on the endgame of settlement can
help the law to answer this question. We next draw on conflicting
case law to delineate the proper inquiry into intraclass conflicts where
the class-settlement terms are known-as they are in all situations of
collateral attack and, earlier, where the rendering court stands to
make the class certification and the class-settlement fairness determinations simultaneously.
a. Which Conflicts Matter
86,

In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court underscored the deep connection between adequate representation in the
intraclass-conflict sense and the design of class settlements. In practical effect, the Amchem class settlement sought to replace the tort system prospectively with a private administrative compensation scheme
for persons exposed to the asbestos-containing products of the defendant companies.8 7 The Amchem class exhibited a fundamental mismatch between its structure and the "essential allocation decisions"
85 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73
NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 913, 918-24 (1998) (articulating an "entity" model of class actions).
86 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
87 Id. at 599-601.
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made in the class settlement. The class encompassed both persons
presently impaired by asbestos-related disease (interested simply in
the immediate payouts described in the settlement) and asbestosexposed persons without present-day impairment, but who might develop an asbestos-related disease in the future (interested in both payout levels and the preservation of resources to fund them years or
decades hence).89 Yet the crux of the class settlement was precisely to
make tradeoffs between these two subgroups within the single, undifferentiated Amchem class-in particular, to provide cash compensation
only if and when a given class member became impaired under specified medical criteria. 90
This tradeoff was far from unexpected. Asbestos litigation was
grinding to a halt over the inability to resolve the critical issue of the
overall exposure of companies with asbestos liabilities. Defendants
could find no respite through settlements, even for the thousands of
claims that were presented in nonclass cases like Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,9" unless some mechanism for back-end finality could be
devised. The proposed class settlement in Amchem provided a means
to free up funds for present claimants precisely because the deal also
included measures that promised to contain the defendants' future
liabilities within a structured system of payments. 2 The technical
question before the Court was whether class litigation-or, more realistically, class settlement-was the appropriate mechanism by which to
provide the indispensable back-end closure. The efforts at peacemaking in the asbestos context after Amchem further highlight the inevitability of cabining future exposures in order to free up present payments. Whether attempted privately (through the National Settlement
Program devised by Owens Corning) :) or publicly (through § 524(g)

88
89

90

Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 602-03.
Id. at 604.

91 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (overturning a trial plan for consolidated
treat-

ment of more than three thousand asbestos cases).
92 Anchem, 521 U.S. at 600-01.
This is a topic we have both addressed before. See
RiCH-ARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETrLEMENT (2007); Samuel Issacharoff, "Shocked": Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1925 (2002).
93 See Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearingon H.
1283 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 134 (1999) (statement of Maura J. Abeln, Senior
Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, Owens Corning) (describing a private
settlement process involving contractual agreements with prominent asbestos plaintiffs' law firms as an alternative to proposed federal asbestos legislation).
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of the Bankruptcy Code, 94 enacted specifically for asbestos-related reorganizations), the result is the same: no defendant could gain any
significant peace from settlement unless it was accompanied by some
long-term mechanism to manage liabilities.
In particular, the dynamics of the asbestos litigation prior to Amchem had made it glaringly apparent that any comprehensive peace
that defendants might prefer to continued slogging through the tort
system would have to involve assurances concerning the compensation
terms for unimpaired persons.15 There not only would have to be a
way of channeling future liabilities in terms of the amounts and timing of future payments, but there also would have to be limitations on
what constituted a compensable claim in the future. The intraclass
conflict in Amchem mattered, in short, because it was already apparent
in the asbestos litigation that any realistic peace would turn on the
making of tradeoffs across critical dividing lines within the proposed
plaintiff class.
As a matter of public policy, there remains considerable debate
over whether the deal envisioned in Amchem would have been a good
one for asbestos plaintiffs. 96 But the desirability of the deal in some
"gestalt" or "overarching" sense does not, in itself, make for a structurally sound class. 97 To say otherwise would be to deny the need for
inquiry into the propriety of the unit for settlement negotiations in
the first place. Any proposed class settlement, irrespective of its particulars, raises an issue as to whether it is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" in the Rule 23(e) sense. This is ultimately the crux of the error
94 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000) (describing the
requirements for an injunction that
would channel asbestos claims against the debtor and related entities to a juridically
separate trust fund for payment).
95 For a more detailed discussion of the strategic dynamics behind the
Amchem

class settlement, see NAGAREDA, supra note 92, at 76-80.
96 Faced with a spate of asbestos-related bankruptcies in
the post-Amchem period
and spurred by language in the Court's opinion, see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628-29, Congress went on to consider seriously proposed asbestos reform legislation that largely
would track the central tradeoff of the Amchem class settlement. See Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposing a $140 billion trust fund to resolve all asbestos claims). Writing some years after Amchem, one
prominent plaintiffs..lawyer lamented that "the multibillion-dollar settlement, rejected
by the Supreme Court, was lost forever, and thousands of claimants who would gladly
have traded their pristine due process rights for substantial monetary compensation
have been consigned to the endless waiting that characterizes asbestos bankruptcies."
ElizabethJ. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation,57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1476 (2005).
See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (noting that class certification standards "serve
to
inhibit.., class certifications dependent upon the court's gestalt judgment or overarching impression of the settlement's fairness").
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in Anzchen made by the district court, which had characterized the
question of whether the proposed class settlement was fair overall as
giving rise to a predominant common issue that warranted class certification tinder Rule 23(b) (3)."s
After Arnchen, the focus on potential intraclass conflicts metastasized.
Every difference in the potential interests of class members
was seemingly fair game for challenge. Whether.on direct or collateral review, challenges to the adequacy of class representation in the
intraclass conflict sense quickly came to center on the contention that
the class was, in one way or another, too encompassing in its scope,
such that subclasses were needed with separate class representatives
and, even more importantly, separate class counsel. 00
Aside from material differences in the interests of various subgroups arising from their differing factual circumstances, differences
in substantive law also have the potential to give rise to intraclass conflicts. In national-market cases involving state law claims, choice of law
analysis often forms a significant barrier to class certification by calling
for application of the substantive law of the multitude of jurisdictions
in which the various class members find themselves 1°' or by offering
different statutes of limitations that might allow for different amounts
of damages.1 02 If anything, CAFA proponents seized on this observation, expanding the federal forum for class actions involving state law

9
99

See id. at 607 (summarizing the district court's reasoning).
For a thoughtful response to the ad infinitum quality of some claimed conflicts,

see Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1141, 1146-48 (8th Cir. 1999).
loo See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (5) (allowing for classes to be divided into subclasses).
Prior to the 2007 restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the portion of Rule
23 concerning subclasses appeared as subsection 23(c) (4) (B).
101See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288
F.3d
1012, 1018, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002) (decertifying a nationwide class action upon a choice
of law determination that the governing law would be that found in each class member's respective home state). Though fifty-one nominally different bodies of state law
rarely amount to fifty-one different laws in substance, even a smaller number of substantive variations may defeat class certification. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTui) § 21.222, at 271 (2004) (noting that the need to keep the variations
distinct may make a single class-wide proceeding unmanageable). For an argument
that choice of law analysis in class actions seeks awkwardly and indirectly to assess the
maturity of the Underlying litigation, see Sue-Yun Ahn, CAFA, Choice-of-Law, and the
Problem of Legal Maturity in Nationwide Class Actions, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 105 (2007).
102 But see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (allowing
the law of
the forum state to provide the statute of limitations for the entire class).
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claims on the expectation that, once in federal court, such actions
simply would not be certified. 103
Differences in the underlying state laws, real or imagined, provide
fertile
field for strategic folderol. For example, class counsel might
a
seek to facilitate class certification in a national market dispute by
pleading the claims of the class in terms of a single body of state substantive law and, in- so doing, avoid the potential pitfall of choice of
law analysis for certification of a nationwide class. Such a strategic
choice by class counsel would not matter when the body of state law
selected either does not differ materially from that of other contending states (a "false conflict" scenario, in choice of law parlance) or is
the most favorable in content to the class (a potential due process
problem for the defendant, 1 4 but not for class members). The same
approach has the potential to give rise to an intraclass conflict, however, where some class members would be able to sue under another
body of state law materially more favorable to them than the common
denominator pleaded in the class complaint.' 0 In any case, a defendant resisting class certification, or a collateral attacker, would quickly
seize on every jot and tittle of difference to create a picture of a disqualifying conflict. In the hands of class counsel, it appeared that by

103 As currently understood, Erie principles require a federal
court sitting in diversity to apply the same choice of law principles as would a state court in the same location. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). But, like the
application of commonly shared class action rules, choice of law analysis-particularly,
under widely used methodologies that call for multifactor balancing-can entail the
exercise of wide discretion by the court. See Issacharoff, supra note 44, at 1844-51
(criticizing the "most significant relationship" standard used in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws). The anomalous court might be inclined to conduct its
choice of law analysis so as to select a single body of substantive law, thereby facilitating
certification of a nationwide class. Cf S. REP. No. 109-14, at 25 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 25 (describing state courts' interference with the laws of other jurisdiction, as in Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003)).
104 See infra Part IL.C (discussing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, and its aftermath).
The discussion here generalizes from the contention of the collateral attack

plaintiff in Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 439 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2006). In
Wolfert, a California state court certified a class action with respect to a California statutory claim concerning the defendant lender's marketing of reverse mortgages. The
class settlement, however, released all claims concerning such mortgages, whatever
their source in substantive law. Id. at 168. The collateral attack plaintiff then sought to
bring various claims under New York law against the settling defendant, alleging inadequate representation in the class proceedings. See id. at 169-70. See generally Patrick
Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits Certified underFederal Rule of Civil Procedure23(b)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799, 825-32 (2004) (discussing strategic decisions by class counsel regarding choilce of law as a potential basis for
inadequate class representation).
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peradventure the common law had evolved identically in every state.106
Yet, in the hands of class opponents, it often seemed a miracle that
Americans are able to cross from one state to another and buy a
newspaper, given the radically different legal regimes said to coexist
across Interstate 80.
No class action can account for all conceivable differences among
its members. 01 7 Simply for the immediate purpose of settlement negotiation, subclassing along every imaginable fissure within the class
would dissipate the very bargaining power that aggregate procedure
seeks to create.1°s By empowering would-be rivals to class counsel to
contend that the class unit should have been sliced ever more finely,
subclassing as a panacea for intraclass conflicts would also threaten
the all-encompassing finality that gives class litigation its ability to obtain superior results from the defendant in settlement negotiations.
In a post-Amchem decision overturning the certification of another
asbestos-related class settlement-this time, for lack of a bona fide limited fund under Rule 23(b) (1) (B)-the Supreme Court in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. noted that subclassing need only account for "easily
identifiable categories" among the persons in the class.' 0 9 Our suggestion is that this reference to "easily identifiable categories" can be
combined with the link drawn in Amchem between subclassing and settlement design in such a way as to impart an outer limit to subclassing.
The identified conflict in Ortiz was significant. There, part of the
class stood to gain from insurance policies that were still solvent but
that covered only exposures up to 1959. Another part of the class was
not exposed to asbestos until after 1959 and was therefore ineligible
for such coverage." 0 The settlement blended the claimants into one
group for purposes of insurance eligibility, in effect creating a cross-

106 As colorfully put by judge Posner, this became the "serendipity theory"
of doc-

trinal evolution. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
107 The Federal Rules capture this difficulty through the use
of the ill-defined term
"predominate" in Rule 23(b)(3). The Rule does not require an identity of issues
among class members, only that the common issues predominate in the litigation. In
our work as Reporters for the AlI, we have been critical of the predominance requirement as creating an acontextual minefield for litigants. At its most basic level,
however, the term captures the sense that aggregate litigation can rarely be expected
to have a perfect identity of interests among all affected participants.
108 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 374-75 (fearing the "Balkanization"
of the class "into
a loose-knit coalition of potentially feuding enclaves that could seldom litigate effectively
as an organization").
1 527 U.S. 815, 832 (1999).
110Id. at 857.
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subsidy from the pre-1959 group to the post-1959 group."' To put the
point more generally: intraclass conflicts are most apparent when a
settlement contemplates a direct wealth transfer from one portion of
the class to another.
Were a class to be certified for litigation purposes, the initial inquiry into intraclass conflicts would occur in total ignorance of the
class-settlement terms, which would not yet exist. Again, this is not the
only posture for the inquiry; it is simply to suggest, at a conceptual
level, that the nature of the inquiry must be such as to be undertaken
fully by a court on direct review without reference to a settlement.
The second feature of the inquiry concerns its operational significance. The composition of the class unit matters not out of an abstract desire for similarity within the class but, rather, because the unit
chosen stands to influence the dynamics for settlement negotiations.
Together, these two features enable the law to identify which differences matter and which do not, with regard to intraclass conflicts.
The ones that matter are those that give rise to a significant potential
for negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class to skew in some
predictable way the design of class-settlement terms in favor of one or
another subgroup for reasons unrelated to evaluation of the relevant
claims. There are several parts to this definition. First, "easily identifiable" means that which is identifiable by reference to the expected
dynamics of class-settlement negotiations. Second, there has to be an
incentive for the negotiation to be skewed in a predictable direction.
Third, the difference in the position of class members must be independent of the substantive merits of their respective claims. Thus,
there is no conflict in an antitrust class action where different class
members will receive larger or smaller compensation depending on
how much of the price-fixed product they purchased during the relevant
time period.
Applied to the controlling Supreme Court asbestos cases, our
definition helps identify which intraclass conflicts are substantial. The
difference between presently impaired and presently unimpaired asbestos claimants mattered in Amchem because of the broadly shared
understanding that any deal would have to make tradeoffs along that
very line-an expectation borne out by the deal ultimately reached.
Similarly, the presence of claimants with recourse to significant insur-

III Even here, the division is not absolute. Many members of the class would have
had exposures before and after 1959 and likely would have been unable to trace the
harmful exposure to any specific time period.
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ance coverage in Ortiz and those without such coverage creates a similar invitation to cross-subsidization by way of the class-settlement
terms. By contrast, another difference mentioned in passing by the
Amchem Court-class members' "expos[ure] to different asbestoscontaining products" from different companies' ' 2-presented no realistic potential to skew the settlement design, for all of the defendant
companies already were jointly represented and had, through that vehicle, previously allocated settlement expenses among themselves. '3
Case law on intraclass conflicts nonetheless remains far from uniform. Consideration of several prominent lower court decisions from
the post-Amchem period pinpoints the proper relationship between intraclass conflicts and the settlement endgame, particularly for settings
in which the settlement terms are known.
b. IntraclassConflicts and the Settlement Endgame
The structural conception of intraclass conflicts sketched here has
two important implications. First, distinctions drawn by the class settlement-for instance, about which class members shall be paid based
upon contingent future events-cannot render the class representation inadequate where no structural conflict existed at the time of the
class judgment. Second, design features of the class settlement might,
in a given instance, dissipate structural conflicts within the class, by
analogy to the familiar doctrine of harmless error. This subsection
addresses the specifics of these two implications and their consistency
with the logic of Amchem.
i. Differences Created by the Settlement
At the outset, it may seem quite straightforward to see that distinctions drawn by the class settlement cannot render inadequate the
structure for class representation where no such conflicts existed at
the time of the class judgment. Current doctrine, however, is not so
straightforward. Juxtaposition of two prominent federal appellate decisions from the post-Amchem period-Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.
from the Second Circuit 4 and Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology & Tele-
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Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (quoting the Third

Circuit opinion, 83 F.3d 610, 626 (1996)).
1
On the operations of the joint-defense entity, see generally Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Centerfor Claims Resolution, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 13.
"4 273 F.3d 249 (2d
Cir. 2001).
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communications, Inc. from the Seventh Circuit ""-illustrates the surprising level of confusion on this first point.
Stephenson involved a challenge to the resolution of the Agent Orange litigation in front of U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein. Agent
Orange was a defoliant used during the Vietnam War, but one whose
exact relation to the subsequent illnesses suffered by exposed Vietnam
veterans was never proven. Substantial adversarial litigation ultimately
yielded a class settlement, which Judge Weinstein approved, and
which the Second Circuit affirmed on direct appeal."" The class settlement provided for cash compensation to class members, were they
to manifest disease within ten years after the class settlement approval.1 1 7 In effect, the settlement provided
veterans with a kind of
S 118
ten-year term health insurance policy.
Unlike the troubling scenario of a class settlement fashioned by colluding lawyers, moreover,

115

309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2002).

116 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd,

818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
17 See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 253. The ten-year
cutoff for cash compensation was
far from arbitrary and surely would not have been invalidated as such had an administrative agency adopted it as part of a public compensation plan for Vietnam veterans.
See Nagareda, supra note 13, at 322. At the time of the class settlement, formidable uncertainty existed as a scientific matter concerning the causal relationship, if any, between Agent Orange and the various diseases of concern to the plaintiff class. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 172-73. (For that matter, evidence of
disease pathology for the exposed population of Vietnam veterans appears still to be
lacking.) The lapse of time-the ten-year cutoff came more than twenty years after the
last alleged exposure to Agent Orange, see Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 252-made a causal
connection increasingly implausible. Indeed, Judge Weinstein-again, with the appellate endorsement of the Second Circuit-went so far as to grant summary judgment
for the defendants for lack of a triable issue on the causation element in individual
cases brought in the immediate aftermath of the class settlement by diseased veterans
who had opted out of the Rule 23(b) (3) class. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Plaintiff Vietnam veterans do suffer.
Many deserve help .... They cannot obtain aid through this suit."), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187
(2d Cir. 1987).
18 We thus find ourselves in disagreement with
commentators who characterize
the Agent Orange class settlement as one in which class members effectively settled
their tort claims in exchange for an arrangement whereby some would receive nothing. See Dana, supra note 13, at 282 (arguing that the strong aversion to uninsurable
risk posited by behavioral economics suggests that no reasonable group of people
would agree to a settlement in which some would receive "no relief whatever" ex post);
Koniak, supra note 13, at 1821 (asserting that "[Stephenson's] group got nothing").
Such a view does not account for the present-day dollar value of any term insurance
policy, something that ordinary consumers routinely regard as valuable in such arrangements as life insurance. That some commentary in praise of Stephenson should
ground itself in behavioral economics, see Dana, supra note 13, at 283-84, thus strikes
us as ironic, at the very least.
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the ten-year cutoff here was the product of the district court's own assessment-informed by the recommendation of a court-appointed
special master, Kenneth Feinberg-of how to allocate fairly the $180
million lump sum that the defendants committed to the deal."" Class
counsel had nothing to gain by spreading the limited settlement proceeds over a ten-year insurance plan as opposed to using it to buy a
twenty- or thirty-year annuity that would pay out less for those who
manifested harm during the policy term. Moreover, because no class
members had any information as to whether they would manifest disease within ten, twenty, or thirty years, all were in exactly the same position regardless of what the term of the insurance coverage might be.
The plaintiffs in Stephenson consisted of individual veterans who
had not opted out of the class and claimed to have been diagnosed
with compensable diseases that manifested after the ten-year cutoff for
cash compensation. In the usual series of moves, Dow Chemical
raised the defense of claim preclusion, which the plaintiffs then
sought to defeat by contending that they had been inadequately represented in the class proceeding, so that preclusion would amount to
a denial of constitutional due process. The Second Circuit sided with
the plaintiffs. The court's reasoning bears precise description, for it
belies the seemingly straightforward point that distinctions drawn by a
class settlement cannot give rise to structural conflicts that did not exist within the class at the time of the classjudgment.
In the crucial sentence of its opinion, the Second Circuit concluded that a fatal conflict existed between the class representatives
and the class members now suing as collateral attack plaintiffs,
"[b]ecause the [class settlement] purported to settle all future claims
[of disease], but only provided for recovery for those whose death or
disability was discovered prior to [the ten-year cutoff].' ' 2 0 In an accompanying footnote, the court made unmistakably clear that the difference that mattered for due process purposes was indeed the one
between veterans who manifested disease, or claimed to have done so,
before and after the ten-year cutoff for cash compensation-not the
difference between veterans who had manifested disease at the time of
the class settlement and those who, at that time, merely stood at risk
of disease in the future.''
This reasoning strikes us as gravely mis11 See SCHUCK, supra note 14, at 145 (describing Special Master
Feinberg's plan to
allocate the settlement fund).
:20 Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260.
121 See id. at 260-61 n.7 (distinguishing earlier cases that held that class members

manifesting disease after the settlement, but before the ten-year cutoff, were ade-

1688

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 156:1649

taken in a way that threatens to resolve the paradox of litigant autonomy and finality only by eliminating finality in class actions under the
supposed command of due process.
First, the Second Circuit confused ex ante probabilities for ex post
probabilities. Imagine a resolution of a case in which every class
member receives an insurance policy against home fires for a ten-year
period. Or imagine an even simpler case in which every class member
receives one hundred lottery tickets as part of a settlement. In all likelihood, only a very small number of class members will have a house
fire within the ten-year period. Likewise, in the second example, a
small-perhaps much smaller-number would actually hit the lottery
with one of the one hundred tickets. Viewed after the fact, the
unlucky fire victims and the lucky lottery winners would appear to
have gotten a disproportionate recovery. Indeed, viewed after the
fact, the nonincendiary members of the class and the unlucky lottery
players would appear to have gotten nothing. But, at the time of the
award, they all obtained something of value: either a ten-year insurance policy or one hundred chances to win the lottery, each of which
has a readily ascertainable present value, in economic parlance.
The difference within the class found unconstitutional in Stephenson was not a difference that existed at the time of the class settlement
and thus, on a structural account, could not possibly skew the design
of any settlement. Simply as a medical matter, it would have been impossible at the time of the class settlement to distinguish those veterans who would go on to manifest disease before the ten-year cutoff
from those who would do so after, if at all. That cutoff was a distinction created by the class settlement, not one that preexisted the class.
The difference that really mattered for due process purposes in Stephenson was precisely the one that the Second Circuit said did not: the
same Amchem-like lumping together of both presently diseased and
presently healthy veterans at the time of the class judgment. Class settlements routinely draw lines, create distinctions, and generate differences in outcome among class members postjudgment. If the mere
quately represented in the class proceedings on the ground that those class members
were still eligible for compensation from the settlement fund). In a decision rendered
prior to Amchem but before Stephenson, the Second Circuit had held that the difference
between veterans with and without disease at the time of the class judgment did not
present an intraclass conflict. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d
1425, 1433-38 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that class members who manifested disease after
the time of the class settlement were properly within the Agent Orange class).
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drawing of those distinctions-even if nonarbitrarily-can give rise to
a due process defect in the representational structure of the class,
then it is hard to see what finality a class action world dominated by
settlement can generate.
A better-reasoned counterexample comes in the Seventh Circuit's
22
decision in Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology & Telecommunications, Inc.'
If the fact pattern of Uhl did not exist, professors may well have invented it for purposes of a law school examination, so neatly does it
illustrate our point. The Uhl class consisted of persons who owned
land located adjacent to various railroad lines. The defendant telecommunications companies had asserted rights of way to lay fiberoptic cable next to the railroad lines. At the time of the class litigation, however, cable had yet to be laid in particular areas and, ultimately, would need to be situated in any given instance on only one
side of the railroad line. Moreover, in many instances, the railroad
line separated one property owner from another, such that only one
of the two owners might suffer the trespass of having cable actually
laid on her land.1 23 Uhl presented the Seventh Circuit on direct review
with an allegation of intraclass conflict in connection with a proposed
class settlement that, unsurprisingly, provided for much higher payouts to those property owners who ultimately ended up on the cable side.
Writing for the court, Judge Diane Wood concluded that the difference between the eventual cable-side and non-cable-side property
owners within the single, undifferentiated Uhl class was beside the
point for purposes of adequate representation. The court emphasized
that "the named representative had an equal incentive to represent
both sides as long as he did not know where his property would end
up. Until the cable has been laid, no 'Cable Side' exists."1 24 The fact
that class members on the eventual cable side would come to be identified and paid more than their non-cable-side cohorts-just like the
veterans who manifested disease within ten years of the Agent Orange
class settlement-had no capacity to skew the settlement design. 125No

12'

309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2002).

123 Id. at

980-81.

124Id. at 986.
125

The court accurately observed that the Uhl class representative stood in a posi-

tion broadly akin to what political philosopher John Rawls envisions as a decision
maker behind the "veil of ignorance" as to how she will fare ex post. See id. (noting
that the class representation would be a "concrete working example of John Rawls'
celebrated theory of the 'veil of ignorance"'); cf JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971). We thus find misplaced the invocation of Rawls in support of the radically dif-
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one knew which class members would be in which cohort, and no
counsel or class representative had any incentive (or ability) to direct
payments to the benefit of any particular class members.
Situating the inquiry into intraclass conflicts within the proper
temporal perspective has additional benefits. As a strategic matter,
collateral attacks along the lines countenanced in Stephenson create a
troubling potential for a kind of one-way ratchet. Settlements of all
sorts take place in the face of uncertainty. In the Agent Orange litigation, for example, there was considerable uncertainty over the causation element as a scientific matter, among other issues. 26 Collateral
attacks necessarily take place at times after the deal is donepotentially years later, after additional information may well have
emerged on the points of uncertainty behind the settlement. 1- Overturning class settlements on due-process grounds whenever new information might suggest an additional source of compensation to
some class members would sound an understandable note of compassion. But that compassion would operate in only one direction. In
the converse scenario, where subsequent information reveals that class
members' claims were meritless all along, the defendant enjoys no
constitutional right to recoup the money it has put into the deal.1s
And any ill-conceived recognition of such a prospect by the law of due
process stands to hurt not only defendants but also class members.

ferent conception of adequate class representation that animates Stephenson. See Dana,
supra note 13, at 282-83 (building an argument upon the Rawlsian notion of fairness).
126In the end, the collateral attack in Stephenson was unsuccessful quite
apart from
the preclusive effect of the class settlement. Judge Weinstein ultimately dismissed the
case based on the government-contractor defense interposed on the merits by Dow
Chemical, and the Second Circuit affirmed. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
344 F. Supp. 2d 873, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 517 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2008). This,
too, was a point of uncertainty at the time of the class settlement. See SciHucK, supra
note 14, at 61-62 (discussing the government contractor defense raised in the Agent
Orange litigation).
Between the time of the Agent Orange class settlement and the Stephenson litigation, a major government study noted the emergence of at least some scientific evidence of a quasi-relationship between Agent Orange and the particular diseasesmultiple myeloma and non-Hodgkins lymphoma-suffered by the collateral attack
plaintiffs. See INST. OF MED., VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HEALTH EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES USED IN VIETNAM 6 (1994); Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 255
(noting Daniel Stephenson's diagnosis with multiple myeloma and Joe lsaacson's diagnosis with non-Hodgkins lymphoma). Tort litigation on the merits would have enabled the plaintiffs to draw on this subsequent evidence.
128 We find unconvincing an attempted defense of the
reasoning in Stephenson in
terms of the adage "better late than never." It is not as if the reasoning embraced in
Stephenson enabled the settling defendants to recoup the $180 million already distributed to the class during the ten-year period.
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Cognizant of the potential for a one-way ratchet, settling defendants
would have to withhold resources from class members in any settlement negotiation as a form of self-insurance against future settlement
enhancements. Evaluating intraclass conflicts from the time of the
class settlement, by contrast, brings the adequacy analysis into line
with the uncertainty that underlies all manner of settlement on both
sides at the relevant time-namely, the time of the classjudgment, not
thereafter.
ii. Differences Dissipated by the Settlement
As often as not, the demand for ever-finer slicing of subclasses is
an objector's ploy that offers little real advantage to class members.
Additional subclassing does not, however, exhaust the universe of potential protections against uncertainty that a class action may offer to
class members. More promising, particularly in the context of substantial personal injuries, is another development since Amchem that
pushes from the opposite direction, adjusting the degree of finality
that the class settlement wields by enhancing litigant autonomy in a
conventional, individualistic sense.
The most ambitious class settlement to be approved in the mass
tort area since Amchem concerned the diet drug combination "fenphen." 12" The fen-phen litigation offers an interesting contrast between formal and functional protections of class member interests.
Amchem prompted a formalistic attachment to subclasses and, to be
sure, the fen-phen class duly included subclasses along multiple dimensions-not only the "obvious" one of present-day disease versus
future disease, 30 but also further division based on categorical differences in claim strength related to the duration of fen-phen use.1 3' Different lawyers were assigned responsibility for the comparative treatment of the subclasses that reflected the various harms that could
129 Professor Issacharoff has served as counsel
to the claimant class for the past ten
years. The discussion herein is taken exclusively from publicly available documents
and court decisions.
13
The Court in Ortiz so described the necessity of division along these lines per
Amchemn. See Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 854-59 (1999) ("[i]t is obvious after Amchetn that a class divided between present and future claims ... requires division
into homogenous subclasses under Rule 23(c) (4) (B), with separate representation to
eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.").
131See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig.), No.
99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (discussing research indicating significantly elevated risk of valvular heart problems for persons who used fenphen for more than three months), aff'd without opinion, 275 F.3d 34 (3d Cir. 2001).
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befall exposed individuals. Unaddressed by Amchem, however, was
how such formal subclasses were supposed to work, particularly for
individuals whose exposure was known but whose future prospects
were necessarily uncertain. Because the future disease progression of
most class members was unknown, the formal distinctions among different parts of the class drawn by way of subclassing represented abstract categories, for the most part, rather than flesh-and-blood persons. In reality, many class members were, in effect, members of
several subclasses, at least potentially.
By contrast, the signature feature of the fen-phen class settlement
had nothing to do with the parceling out of subclass representation.
Rather, the settlement in its original form afforded additional individual protections that allowed class members to return to the tort system should the settlement fail to meet their claims. These were
termed "back-end" opt-out rights-that is, opportunities for class
members to sue the defendant in tort at times after the one-shot,
front-end opt-out process required by Rule 23(c) (3). Class members
could exercise these back-end opt-out rights in the event of specified
heart abnormalities in the future and only with an accompanying
2
price: the inability to seek punitive damages for their tort claims. 13
The back-end opt-out rights created by the original fen-phen class
settlement, like many novel experiments in the law, proved to be vulnerable in practice. Rivals to class counsel within the fen-phen plaintiffs' bar undertook a multifront strategy of back-end opt outs, presentation of dubious claims for compensation under the class settlement
in large numbers, Rule 60(b) motions for reconsideration, and collateral attacks. 33 After several years, court-approved amendments to the
class settlement ultimately supplemented its back-end opt-out rights
with a more conventional, "once and for all" opt-out process for those
still in the class who chose not to avail themselves of the original set-

132 See id. at *49 n.22. On the procedural legitimacy of this
price, as distinct from
others that a class settlement might set, see Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and
Put Options in the Mass Tort ClassAction, 115 HARv. L. REV. 747, 805-22 (2002).
133 See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431
F.3d 141, 149-50 (3d Cir. 2005) (denying collateral review of adequacy of representation with respect to class members
who had exercised opt-out rights); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 89 F. App'x 314,
318 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding the rejection of a challenge to the adequacy of notice as
to opt-out rights); Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig.), No. 99-20593, 2002 AL 32067308, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (discussing the flood of
settlement claims). See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: PreservingAdjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REv. 383, 413-16 (2007) (discussing
the aftermath of the fen-phen settlement).

2008]

CLASS SETLEMENTS UNDER A YA CK

1693

tlement structure.' 34 For now, our general observation is simply that
the design of a class settlement may dissipate intraclass conflicts rather
than accentuate them, as in Arnchem. Given that such conflicts matter
because of their potential to skew settlement design, it is only fitting
for the court to consider that design when it is known, as it is inherently on collateral review and on direct review when it involves simultaneous class certification and class-settlement approval. Evidence of
actual design, when available, properly informs the inquiry into the
potential for skewed design by enabling the court to make an assessment in the nature of harmless error.
The basic idea is quite simple, even if problematic in execution.
The less a class settlement purports to cover all future contingencies,
the lower the risk of constraining class members improperly. This is
not to say that the settlement design itself can substitute for the necessary cohesiveness of the basic class interests. The Amchem Court
rightly rejected the notion that the existence of a proposed class settlement in itself, and irrespective of its content, may supply the
grounds that legitimize class-wide treatment. In positing that settlement design may dissipate intraclass conflicts, we mean simply to connect adequate representation in that sense to the well-established notion that the process "due" as a constitutional matter is necessarily
sensitive to the nature and degree of the deprivation at stake. 135 The
class-settlement terms define the deprivation in a given instance and,
as such, influence the process due. On this view, subclassing loses its
talismanic quality in favor of a role as one of a number of structural
protections for absent class members. Moreover, an inquiry framed in
terms of the array of protections afforded may reveal that subclassing
is only one among many mechanisms-and not necessarily the most
protective means-for individual protection.
One may grasp readily enough the implications of this view in the
case of back-end opt-out rights. Where the settlement design itself
preserves a degree of conventional litigant autonomy in tile nature of
self-help, there should be less pressure on the exact terms of the class
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
135This proposition takes its most salient form in the framework that determines
the procedural protections required for deprivations of government-created property
rights without close analogues in the common law. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976) (calling for calibration of the process due based on the "the private
interest that will be affected[,] ... the risk of an erroneous deprivation ... and the
probable value ... of additional or substitute procedural safeguards[,] . .. [and] the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail").
134
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composition.
Individual class members, particularly if the stakes are
high enough, can be expected to make independent decisions within
the terms offered by the settlement. It is true, of course, that settlements that preserve a great deal of litigant autonomy may not actually
yield peace. However, these matters are appropriately left first to the
settlement designers and then to the court on direct review for classsettlement fairness; they are not the stuff of a possible constitutional
defect in the class structure.
Creative mechanisms, such as back-end opt-out rights, signal that a
welcome degree of latitude should exist for experimentation in classsettlement design. If the due process concern is understood to be
primarily over the fidelity and adequacy of the representative, then a
range of protections may prove superior to ad infinitum subclassing.
The fen-phen litigation provides another example: conditioning the
fee award for the class representation upon the performance of class
counsel. Faced with considerable delays in the distribution of compensation under the class settlement due to an influx of dubious
claims, the district court provided for delay in its fee award to class
counsel, pending further information on the actual operation of the
settlement regime over time.1 37 In effect, this wait-and-see approach
to fees amounts to a working translation of the prescription in CAFA
for the specific context of coupon settlements in consumer class litigation-there, the setting of the fee award based on the value of the
coupons actually redeemed
by
•1
138 class members rather than the value of
all coupons made available.
Similar concerns surrounding the acAs expressed by judge Posner, "[t]he less that is at stake, ... the less process
is
due." Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1353 (7th Cir. 1997). For an earlier suggestion of this point in connection with the fen-phen class settlement, see Coffee, supra note 4, at 432-33.
137 Am. Home Prods. Corp, 2002 WL 32067308, at
*25. The court only recently finalized its fee award. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig.), No. 99-20593, 2008 WL 942592 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2008).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (Supp. V 2005) ("[A]ttorney's fee award to
class counsel.., shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed."). On the problems presented by coupon settlements, see Christopher R.
Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 996-97 (2002) (arguing that, because class counsel
are paid in cash, they do not have an adequate incentive to ensure that class members
receive meaningful compensation rather than restrictive coupons); Geoffrey P. Miller
& Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 97, 130-31 (summarizing a theoretical and empirical analysis of coupon
and other nonpecuniary settlements to identify the benefits and costs of these arguments); Protecting Consumer Interests in Class Actions, Panel 1: The Use of "Coupon" Compensation and Other Non-Pecunimy Redress, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1161 passim (2005)
136
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tual take-up rate under class settlements have arisen even in such familiar settings as securities class actions involving institutional investors.""
Taken together, the various means to protect the interests of absent class members allow a reviewing court to insist less fastidiously on
alignment of interests among the class members. 140 Here again, the
fact of settlement irrespective of its content is not what legitimizes the
structure of the class. Rather, the particular content of the settlement
chosen, when it is known, properly informs the inquiry into whether
an asserted difference within the class should matter for structural
purposes or whether the absence of subclassing to account for that
difference amounts to harmless error.
2. Class Counsel Conflicts
In many class actions, there is little realistic prospect of individual
class members playing an active role, either in monitoring class counsel or pursuing their own interests independently. In most consumer
cases and other negative-value class actions, the individual class members do not have the significant economic stake that might allow subsequent recourse in the civil justice system-as was true for back-end
opt-outs in the fen-phen context. More often than not, the only real
protection for absent class members takes the form of the incentives
operating on class counsel. Here, too, both Ortiz and Amchem shed
light.
Apart from the divergent interests within the two classes of asbestos-exposed persons, the lawyers that purported to represent them in
each instance labored under the same type of conflict vis-;I-vis the

(discussing at a Federal Trade Commission Workshop whether coupon settlements
provide adequate relief to consumers).
139 SeeJames D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
EmpiricalEvidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of FinancialInstitutions to Participate
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 424 (2005) (investigating the
frequency with which financial institutions submit claims in settled securities class actions and finding that less than thirty percent of institutional investors perfect their
claims).
140 This, too, has a due process pedigree in keeping
with the operation of many
class settlements as privatized administrative compensation regimes. The process that
constrains rulemaking by public administrative agencies consists not of the kind of individual autonomy for affected persons found in conventional civil litigation, but
rather, primarily of measures that hew the administrators' interests in retaining their
governing powers to the welfare of those affected by their actions. See Bi-Metallic Inv.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding, as to agency rulemaking, that affected individuals have no due process right to an individualized hearing because they may hold decision makers accountable through the political process).
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class. In each case, class counsel consisted of asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers who had large "inventories" of clients with conventional suits already on file in the tort system.
The class definitions in both Ortiz
and Amchem excluded these inventory cases, encompassing only asbestos-exposed persons who had not already sued the relevant defendants
in tort. 142 The class settlements nonetheless occurred contemporaneously with a series of aggregate settlements for inventory cases in the
tort system14-not only those in the inventories of class counsel but
also those represented by other asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers.' 44 The
terms of these aggregate settlements differed from those in the class

settlement, however, providing cash compensation for unimpaired
persons, albeit without the insurance-like promise that class members
would have garnered against the risk that they might become im4

paired in the future.
All told, the situation presented significant potential for class
counsel to skew the design of the class-settlement terms for reasons
unrelated to considered evaluation of the relevant claims-in essence,
to compromise the interests of future claimants in exchange for advantageous aggregate settlements for the group of asbestos claimants
with cases pending.4 In one sense, this is entirely proper, for class
counsel had direct attorney-client relations with those claimants in
their own inventories and owed them a duty of zealous representation.
141 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 824
(1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601 (1997).
142 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 819; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 601.
143 These aggregate settlements consisted of settlements for nominally
separate
tort cases brought on behalf of individual plaintiffs, albeit represented by the same law
firm within the asbestos plaintiffs' bar. On the variety of ways in which aggregate settlements might be structured, see Howard M. Erichson, A ypology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1769 (2005).
144 See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157
F.R.D. 246, 294-96 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (providing a list of the settlements of inventory claims).
1
See, e.g., id. at 292 (noting that inventory cases were settled in exchange for full
releases by plaintiffs, whereas class members without present-day disease could seek compensation under the class settlement in the event of disease manifestation in the future).
146 See Ortiz, 527 U.S.
at 852:

In this case.., any assumption that plaintiffs' counsel could be of a mind to
do their simple best in bargaining for the benefit of the settlement class is
patently at odds with the fact that at least some of the same lawyers representing plaintiffs and the class had also negotiated the separate settlement of
45,000 pending claims .... Class counsel thus had great incentive to reach
any agreement in the global settlement negotiations that they thought might
survive a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, rather than the best possible arrangement for the substantially unidentified global settlement class.
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But the reality of asbestos litigation created a tremendous dilemma for
designing any kind of binding work-out of the defendants' asbestos
liabilities.
No group of lawyers could plausibly claim to negotiate a prospective settlement of asbestos claims without deep immersion in the real
world of asbestos litigation. But any such experienced asbestos plaintiffs' lawyer would, of necessity, have had large numbers of inventory
cases.14 7 Indeed, no lawyer without significant immersion in asbestos
litigation could credibly be thought to have the stature to negotiate
such a complex deal. But this observation only serves to underscore
the structural nature of the deficiency in the class representation.
That class counsel owed a specific duty to represent zealously their
own present claimants is what raised the potential for arbitrage detrimental to the class. A differently structured class-one, as in the fenphen litigation, that encompassed all pending cases 4 Would have
eliminated the conflict posed by class counsel's inventories by eliminating the potential for disparate treatment of the class on grounds
unrelated to claim merit, even if that particular mechanism might
prove unavailing given the long latency period of asbestos exposure.
In short, the class counsel conflicts in Amchem and Ortiz amounted to
disabling conflicts because of the structure of the classes involved.

147

AsJustice Breyer noted in dissent:

Of course, class counsel consisted of individual attorneys who represented
other asbestos claimants, including many, other Fibreboard claimants outside
the certified class. Since Fibreboard had been settling cases ... for several
years, any attorney who had been involved in previous litigation against Fibreboard was likely to suffer from a similar 'conflict.' So whom should the District Court have appointed to negotiate a settlement that had to be reached
soon, if ever? Should it have appointed attorneys unfamiliar with Fibreboard
and the history of its asbestos litigation? 'Where was the District Court to find
those competent, knowledgeable, conflict-free attorneys? The District Court
said they did not exist.
Id. at 878.
148 See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No.
99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (noting that the fen-phen
class complaint "was filed as a vehicle for combining the claims of class members asserted in pending federal and state diet drug litigation throughout the country into a
single complaint to facilitate class action treatment of those claims for settlement purposes"), aff'd without opinion, 275 F.3d 34 (3d Cir. 2001).
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B. PerformanceDefects
People make mistakes in litigation, as in life. No clearly defined
metric states the value of a given claim or the potential reservation
price of one's adversary in settlement negotiations. Uncertainty
abounds in the environment of imperfect information that almost invariably surrounds litigation. So, what happens when a class settlement appears to be a bad deal? It is one thing to say that parties in
customary one-to-one litigation may have settled unwisely. But class
settlements necessarily complicate this picture because of the noncontractual agency relationship between class counsel and the absent class
members. It is one thing to make a bad deal for yourself; it is quite
another to be bound to the terms of such a deal accepted on your behalf by another.
Some account must therefore be made for class settlements that
simply do not provide an adequate return to class members. With
characteristic economic flair, Judge Richard Posner famously describes judicial review of class-settlement fairness in Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank as an effort "to quantify the net expected value of
continued litigation to the class, since a settlement for less than that
value would not be adequate.' 149 The phrasing is both revealing and
problematic. The insufficiency of class recovery is quickly equated to
the critical concern for adequate representation under the Constitution and Rule 23. Assent by class counsel to an unfair deal in the Reynolds sense amounts to a lack of "adequate" class representation in the
most commonplace terms. As the preceding section has noted, structural conflicts of interest matter because of their potential to lead to
unfair settlements. A bad deal, however, also might arise quite apart
from improper class composition or conflicted lawyers. Unfair settlements are a well-nigh inherent risk of class action litigation, precisely
because of its representative nature. 150

149

288 F.3d 277, 284-85 (7th Cir. 2002); see also id. at 285 ("Determining [the net

expected value of continued litigation to the class] would require estimating the range
of possible outcomes and ascribing a probability to each point on the range.").
150We consciously bracket the question raised by some commentators
as to
whether a method for fee calculation other than those long established might make
the risk of an inadequate class settlement something less than an inherent feature of
class litigation. See generally Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 4 (focusing on the postAmchem context).
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Our discussion here draws on the now extensive economic literature on the class action device.' 5' One widely shared insight in the literature is that even fee-calculation methods that reward class counsel
for additional increments of settlement value obtained for the classas does the dominant method, which casts the fee award in terms of a
percentage of the common fund recovered for the class' -still do
not perfectly align the incentives of class counsel with those of class
members.'5 3 The richness of detail in the literature on this subject
need not detain us here, for the gist of the point is easily stated: even
unconflicted class counsel for a properly composed class might shirk
their responsibilities.
In colloquial terms, counsel simply might not work hard enough
to maximize the value of the settlement given that, among other
things, class counsel would bear all of the marginal cost associated
with such effort but capture only part of the marginal benefit in the
form of a larger fee award.154 The defendant in a reverse-auction scenario plays on this residual risk of shirking by parking a desired class
settlement with class counsel most inclined to shirk in exchange for at
least some measure of a fee award. But for all the richness found in
discussions of the agency problem in class representation, the fact remains that agency problems abound in all legal representation. A
lawyer paid on a contingency-fee basis might shirk even if she has only
151For an overview of the literature, see Charles Silver, Class Actions-Representative

Proceedings, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECON. 194 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
De Geest eds., 2000).
152 The lodestar method, by contrast, calculates the
fee award by multiplying the
hours reasonably devoted to the litigation by class counsel by a reasonable hourly rate.
Empirical research nonetheless documents that, as applied byjudges, fee awards under
the percentage-of-recovery and lodestar methods correlate remarkably closely with one
another. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, I J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 47-72 (2004) (presenting
data on client recovery and fee awards).
153This shows, within the class action setting, the general
point in the economic
literature that no principal-agent relationship ever aligns the interests perfectly. Some
do better; some do worse. Although contingency-fee arrangements in ordinary litigation better incentivize counsel to maximize the recovery and to do so swiftly, they do
not align perfectly the interests of lawyer and client. See, e.g.,
Hugh Gravelle & Michael
Waterson, No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees, 103 ECON. J. 1205
(1993) (identifying potential conflicts of interest between the client and lawyer).
154See generally Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioningfor Loyalty: Selection
and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 69, 72-78 (2004) (listing several models
which denote the agency problems in class representation); ElliottJ. Weiss &John S.
Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce Agency
Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2074-79 (1995) (noting the potential
for plaintiffs' attorneys' opportunistic behavior).
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one client. Alternatively, a lawyer for many claimants may be tempted
to gamble on long-shot recoveries across a portfolio of cases-say, with
regard to the possibility of punitive damages at trial-even if the recoveries of many individuals would predictably be compromised.
Similarly, lawyers paid on an hourly basis may chase remote litigation
options at the client's expense.
Simply stated, agency relationships are rife with difficulties, and
even well-structured classes may yield an unfair deal. Sweeping all
agency difficulties under the rubric of adequate representation obscures critical differences between structural conflicts and mediocre
results. As Part III will elaborate, the two different meanings of adequate representation matter, for only the first bespeaks a proceeding
illegitimate from its inception and, as such, relatively more suited for
collateral review. There is an intuitive difference, in short, between
the existence of legitimate authority to act upon class members on an
aggregate basis and the proper exercise of that authority in the settlement at hand.
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Stephenson illustrates the ease
with which a court might mistake an alleged performance defect for a
structural defect. 55 Stephenson compounds this error through a confused analysis of the returns to different class members.'56 Nonetheless, lower court decisions since Amchem aside, the confusion between
structural defects and performance defects runs even deeper in the
law. As we now discuss, the Supreme Court itself has contributed substantially to the confusion in its treatment of personal jurisdiction in
the class action context.
C. The JurisdictionalConfusion
As discussed earlier, one of the distinguishing features of the
modern class action is the likely geographic dispersal of class members
who find themselves similarly situated with respect to the defendant's
market-wide conduct. As a result, much class action litigation today
involves class members who might well lack the kinds of "minimum
contacts" with the forum that would assert personal jurisdiction over
them in the aggregate. It certainly would be difficult for all class
members in such a situation to be bound by the samejudgment if they

155 Stephenson

v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257-61 (2d Cir. 2001) (reviewing

both collateral attack and due process considerations).
516Id. at 255, 259-61.
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had to operate under the familiar due process principles for personal
jurisdiction applicable to defendants. 15 The kinds of classes subject to
CAFA tend strongly toward this description.
Speaking to personal jurisdiction in the class setting in its 1985
decision in Shutts, the Supreme Court distinguished categorically between absent class members and defendants.15 Unlike a defendant,
an absent class member "is not required to do anything," but rather,
"may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in
knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection."'59 We
shall return later to whether this image of the supine absent class
member who need not "fend for himself' 160 continues to hold true
categorically. 6 ' For now, it is enough to recognize, along with the
Shutts Court, that the haling of absent class members into a remote forum presents categorically less of an intrusion on their liberty than the
corresponding compelled presence of a defendant.161
In place of the usual test for personal jurisdiction, the Court in
Shutts substituted a checklist of what commentators label as "exit,"
"voice," and "loyalty" rights: 10 respectively, the opportunity to opt out
of the class, notice of the opportunity "to be heard and to participate
in the litigation," and-our focus here-a due process requirement
"that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members."' 64 For this last component, the
Court cited its earlier decision in Hansberry,16 a precedent to which we
shall return shortly.
See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (setting forth
the
familiar "minimum contacts" requirement for personal jurisdiction over defendants).
158 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)).
159 Id. at 810.
160 Id. at
809.
61 See infra Part III.A (discussing the holding in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1
157

(2002), that absent class members may not take a direct appeal from the approval of a
class settlement absent objection in the district court fairness hearing).
162 See 472 U.S. at 809 (noting, for example, that there is no threat of a default
judgment if a plaintiff fails to appear).
163 See, e.g.,
Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 341-42; Coffee, supra note 4, at 376.
64 472 U.S. at 812. We bracket the lingering debate over the
capacity of a mandatory class action to encompass in any fashion claims for damage relief in light of the
right to opt out prescribed in Shutts. See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386,
392 (9th Cir. 1992) (withholding preclusive effect from the mandatory class settlement, at least as to damage claims raised via collateral attack); In re Real Estate Title &
Settlement Serv. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 1989) (withholding, in an
earlier decision in the Brown litigation, injunctive power from the rendering federal
court for the mandatory class vis-A-vis state court collateral attack).
165 472

U.S. at 812.
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No sooner than personal jurisdiction was added to the due process baggage of class actions, however, did it become yet another
source of contention over the proper scope for collateral attacks. On
one account, jurisdictional defects comprise the paradigmatic basis
for collateral review of civil judgments generally and, as such, would
seem to provide fertile ground for claims of a right to de novo collateral review of the adequate-representation question in a class action.
The syllogism seems inescapable: if adequate representation is to be
included as an aspect of jurisdiction, and if jurisdiction is a basis for
de novo collateral review, it would follow that adequate representation
must be so reviewed. 6 6 Our suggestion here is that preclusion principles drawn from the world of conventional civil litigation cannot, by
themselves, generate a coherent theory of class-settlement review. On
that score, the labeling of adequate representation "at all times" as an
aspect ofjurisdiction in Shutts confuses as much as it illuminates.117
The simple fact is that national markets transcend the territorial
boundaries of particular states. As a result, national markets give rise
to both legal claims and demands for closure that are national in
scope. Where jurisdiction realistically cannot turn on some vestigial
notion of territoriality, the basis for the rendering court's assertion of
authority over absent class members must proceed on some other basis-in Shutts, implied consent to a process that combines rights in the
vein of self-help (exit and voice rights) with a right to oversight by fiduciaries (loyalty rights, whereby "the court and named plaintiffs protect [absent class members'] interests"'6 ). One or another aspect of
this fiduciary oversight undoubtedly exists "at all times" in class proceedings.
The leap from fiduciary oversight as an aspect of personal jurisdiction to the broadest parameters for collateral attacks, however, is considerable. Here, the reference to adequate representation "at all
times" as a component of personal jurisdiction is a source of understandable confusion. Jurisdictional defects are the paradigmatic
grounds for collateral review in ordinary litigation, because such de-

166

See, e.g., Woolley, supra note 13, at 388 ("The argument for limiting collateral

attack contradicts two fundamental principles: first, a court has no jurisdiction over
absent class members who have not been adequately represented; second, a judgment
entered without jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked if the party bound by the
judgment did not appear and had no obligation to do so.").
167 472 U.S. at 812.
1 Id. at 809.
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fects speak to the authority of the rendering court to act at all.169 A
due process command for adequate representation "at all times" is
susceptible to overextension, however, if read to admit no difference
between structural defects and performance defects in class representation. Both, to be sure, can be a concern at some point within the
Yet, only structural defects go to the authority to
class proceeding.
aggregate, as distinct from the manner of its exercise.
Elevated attention to personal jurisdiction in the class action context also would present a paradoxical departure from the normal setting of litigation. In a conventional lawsuit, the absence of personal
jurisdiction is a disfavored defense. It must be raised affirmatively in
the answer to the complaint (or by a Rule 12 motion) or be forever
waived. The procedural rules are notoriously reluctant to allow
claimed defects in personal jurisdiction to be hidden from view, only
to surface when litigation has'run much of its course. A defect in personal jurisdiction is not like some crucial fact in an M. Night Shyamalan film: something to be revealed to the viewer only in the final
scene. Yet if performance defects really could form the basis for ajurisdictional deficiency, they would undo class actions in the fashion of
the now-famous ending of The Sixth Sense: they would reveal at the last
moment that the class action, like Bruce Willis's character, actually has
been dead all along. Everywhere else in procedural law, jurisdiction is
the paradigmatic subject of first-order inquiry that courts are obliged
to address at the outset of a lawsuit. The inclusion of "adequate representation" in the Shutts due process checklist accordingly should be
read in a similar light-as speaking to structural defects in class representation, and not to performance defects. In the ordinary sequence,
after all, performance defects become apparent only at the end of the
class litigation, not at its inception in the manner of the inquiry into
personal jurisdiction for ordinary actions.

169

See generally Woolley, supra note 13, at 392 n.24 (citing Harold L. Korn, The IM.

velopment of JudicialJurisdiction in the United States: Part 1, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 970
(1999) (distinguishing between direct and indirect jurisdiction related to judgment
enforceability); FLEMINGJAMES,JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 53 (4th ed. 1992)
("The exercise of judicial jurisdiction implies the authority to enter legally binding
judgments and to use the coercive powers of executive agencies (for example, the
sheriff) to compel compliance with those judgments.").
'70 See, e.g.,
Monaghan, supra note 13, at 1173 ("Fl's in personamjurisdiction... is
not permanently established by a class member's failure to opt out. Thatjurisdiction is
conditioned upon adequate representation 'at all times,' such that jurisdiction is lost
when representation is inadequate.... It is not finally established until the FI proceedings have been concluded in accordance with due process.").
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Moreover, simply as a matter of precedent, neither Shutts nor
Hansberry warrants the equating of structural and performance defects. Shutts did not present either form of defect vis-A-vis absent class
members. From the perspective of class members, both the structure
of their litigation unit (a collection of small-stakes claims unmarketable on an individual basis 17 ) and the performance of class counsel
(winning a multimillion dollar damages award against the defendant
under Kansas substantive law) were quite advantageous. If anything,
the potential due process difficulty in Shutts lay in subjecting the defendant to the class-wide damage award under Kansas law.172 Shutts, in
other words, presented a situation apt to become vanishingly rare in
the post-CAFA world: an effort to turn something like the anomalous
state court-at least, a court willing to project the law of its home turf
across the nation-to the plaintiff class's advantage against the defen173
dant's resistance.
Viewed in this light, the Shutts Court's reliance on Hansbeny underscores the critical concern that there must be some threshold
alignment of interest to constitute a class. This alignment of interest
becomes a requirement of constitutional dimensions, such that stark,
180-degree misalignments-there, the intraclass conflict between
those property owners subject to the racially restrictive covenant in-

171

The Shutts Court noted that the individual damage claims of class members

amounted to only one hundred dollars on average. 472 U.S. at 801; cf Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("'The policy at the very core of the
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights."' (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
172 At the time, the rendering Kansas court had not undertaken a "thoroughgoing
treatment" of the choice of law question, even though nearly all of the underlying contractual agreements and the absent class members otherwise had no connection to the
state. 472 U.S. at 814-15, 818. On remand, the Kansas court persisted in applying Kansas law, but this time, based on a choice of law analysis that, in the court's view,
deemed any nominal differences in substantive law as between Kansas and other contending states to present a false conflict. See Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 732 P.2d
1286, 1312-13 (Kan. 1987). The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld this determination as a matter of the full faith and credit owed by Kansas to the laws of the other
contending states. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988) (holding
that it is "not enough" for a state to "misconstrue the law of another State" in the
course of finding a false conflict and that a constitutional violation occurs only when
such a construction "contradict[s]" the law of the other state "that is clearly established
and that has been brought to the court's attention").
173 See Stephen C. Yeazell, OverhearingPartof a Conversation: Shutts as a Moment
in a
Long Dialogue,74 UMKC L. REv. 779, 781 (2006) (suggesting that the Kansas forum was
chosen, in all likelihood, to position class counsel to pursue application of what was
thought to be the atypically pro-plaintiff law of Kansas concerning natural gas leases).
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terested in enforcing it and those interested in resisting it74-plainly

do not afford due process. The misalignment in Hansbeny, in other
words, was of the structural kind.
Hansberry was a collateral attack of sorts, in the sense that the procedural dispute in the case centered on the preclusive effect, if any, of
an earlierjudgment in an Illinois equitable forerunner of the modern
class action. But Hansberny actually has little bearing on the contemporary debates over collateral challenges. To begin with, Hansbery
was a locally confined dispute, such that the search for a welcoming
second court was not present. Second, Hansbeny did not occasion judicial examination of the relationship between what we now know as
direct and collateral review. At the time, Illinois practices in equity
provided forjudicial oversight as to the class treatment of the underlying claims only after the entry of ajudgment in the aggregate, not before.
In something of a shock to the modern eye, Illinois procedure at
the time "required no further action beyond pleading a claim as 7a
class action in order for the case to be treated as a class action." 5
What we know today as the class-certification determination "was unheard of," for "Illinois courts did not make the determination that a
case was in fact a class action until a second lawsuit was filed, when a
party to that case argued that an opposing party was bound by the
judgment in the prior case.""17" A cohesive theory of class-settlement
review is unnecessary when there are not multiple facets to coordinate
but, instead, just a single, after-the-fact inquiry that necessarily takes

place de novo and in a collateral posture-perhaps, in a court other
than the one that rendered the disputed judgment,
or at least in a set
77
of claims distinct from the original action.

174 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940) ("[l]t is evident that those signers

or their successors who are interested in challenging the validity of the agreement and
resisting its performance are not of the same class in the sense that their interests are
identical so that any group who had elected to enforce rights conferred by the agreement could be said to be acting in the interest of any others who were free to deny its
obligation.").
•Jay Tidmarsh, The Stoy of Hansberry: The Foundationfor Modern Class Actions,
in
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIEs 217, 253 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004); see also Kahan &
Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond, supra note 13, at 266 (commenting on the lack of
formal procedures for class certification under Illinois equity practice at the time).
'76Tidmarsh, sura note 175, at 253.
177 We accordingly find overstated arguments
that invoke Hansberny as well-nigh
controlling precedent in the modern debates over collateral attacks. See, e.g.,
Woolley,
supra note 13, at 384 ("May an absent class member who has been inadequately represented attack the class judgment in subsequent litigation? The traditional answer,
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The treatment of Hansberryprovides a convenient transition to the
second point of confusion raised by the reference in Shutts to adequate representation "at all times." Both Hansbeny and Shutts speak to
the "what" of class-settlement review, reminding us of the due process
underpinnings of adequate representation. But neither frames, much
less answers, the question addressed in the next Part: how the law
should conceive of the relationship between direct and collateral review, with attention to the multiple meanings of adequate representation and the problem of the anomalous court. The notion of adequate representation "at all times" does not prescribe what form the
judicial inquiry into that subject might take at different times relative
to the entry of the classjudgment. We now take up that enterprise.
III. THE FORMS OF REVIEW

This Part investigates the possible forms for a class-settlement challenge. Much attention has focused on the forum in which a challenge
might be lodged and on the various kinds of failures that one might
attribute to the class representation. By contrast, the narrower procedural question regarding the form of the challenge has tended to be
overlooked.
The central question here is not so much whether a class action
settlement may be challenged but what the form of the challenge
should be. Stated most simply, some avenue for challenge is always
available. No claimant may be bound to a class settlement in which
she has an individual stake without notice and the opportunity to opt
out. The latter alone is a form of challenge. So, too, is the right of
7
appeal, especially since the Supreme Court in Devlin v. Scardelletti"
afforded appellate standing to anyone who is to be bound by the class
settlement and who has objected at the trial-court level, regardless of
any formal intervention. Further, challenges brought on the basis of
information unearthed postjudgment, such as collusion between
plaintiffs' counsel and the settling defendant, appropriately trigger
the framework for relief from final judgments under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) for all civil actions. Some avenue for challenge,
in short, is always available.
The prospect of a true collateral attack-which we define as the
seeking of relief from ajudgment in a forum unrelated to the court of
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee, has been a clear 'yes."' (internal
footnotes omitted)).
178536"U.S. 1 (2002).
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first instance-arises only when there is some threshold justification
put forward that would explain why the customary forms of review
cannot or should not suffice. In our view, therefore, the question of
what to do with collateral attacks properly begins with the scope of direct review and an examination of the situations that warrant departure from that standard form of review.
A. Direct Review by a Fiduciary Court
1. Fiduciaries and the Right of Appeal
In recent decades, much has changed in our conception of the
judge's role in complex litigation. Abram Chayes identified the beginnings of this shift in "public law litigation" during the 1970s, as civil
rights and institutional reform lawsuits led judges to assume an ongoing, quasi-administrative role rather than the usual posture of "neutral
umpires" in a dispute between adversaries. 179 With appropriate nods
to Chayes, subsequent commentators went on to highlight a similar
shift in the role of courts in class actions generally, even in private-law
areas such as torts. 180 While the court does not fully occupy the inquisitorial role of civil law tradition, it comes close. As Judith Resnik
has noted,' 8 ' the court constructs the critical party (the certification
decision), creates a noncontractual representational relationship (the
appointment of class counsel), and confers a state-subsidized monopoly (the ability to bind class members in the absence of affirmative
choice on their part).
The change in the judicial function has brought with it a change
in the normative conception of the judge. In one prominent articulation, Judge Posner in Reynolds speaks of the court on direct review as
"a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of
care that the law requires of fiduciaries."'' s2 This conception flows not
17 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARv. L. REv.
1281, 1286 (1976).
Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U.
80 See, e.g.,

MIcii.J.L. REFORM 647, 668-82 (1988);Jonathan T. Molot, An OldJudicialRolefora New
LitigationEra, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 35-36 (2003).
1s1 Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions CreatingSubsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2127-29 (2000).
182 Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th
Cir. 2002); see also In
re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d
Cir. 1995) (Becker, J.) (noting the "fiduciary responsibility" of the court in classsettlement review).
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from the kind of principal-agent relationship that usually underlies
the imposition of fiduciary duties but, rather, from the court's role as
the governmental institution with make-or-break power over the class
action enterprise. At its most basic, a class-settlement deal may not be
consummated without the imprimatur of a court. 13
Precisely because of the heightened solicitude owed to them, class
members should have the ability and should be incentivized to seek
review before the court of first instance. Two implications flow from
the special role of the court of first instance here. First, the fiduciary
conception implies that the court's vigilance may extend to matters
beyond those raised by any particular litigant, especially with respect
to the adequacy of representation. This is in keeping with what fiduciaries are supposed to do: look out for the interests of persons in a
vulnerable position, even when no one else tells the fiduciary to do so.
As we shall explain shortly, recognition of this implication informs the
debate over collateral attacks in a way that casts conventional issuepreclusion principles in a new light.
Second, as evidenced by Devlin, the broad impact of class certification by the court of first instance requires a similarly expansive right
of direct appeal.18 4 The usual stricture of appellate procedure holds
that only a "party" may appeal an adverse judgment. 88 In the class action setting, however, the Court found the "party" label to be considerably less than self-defining 16-understandably
so, given the conceptual development of "party" status with reference to conventional,
non-aggregate litigation. Devlin recognized that, as a functional matter, absent class members stand to be bound by the class settlement
and therefore must be "allowed to appeal the approval of a settlement
when they have objected at the fairness hearing."' 87 The garnering of
formal "party" status by way of intervention under Rule 24 is not necessary. 188

183 See

Brummer, supra note 34, at 1064 ('judges are not agents of plaintiffs, tradi-

tionally conceived. There is neither a contract nor a pledge of loyalty to plaintiffs; if
anything, they act on behalf of the state and larger civil society.").
184 Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S.
1, 10 (2002).
185 Id. at 7 (noting the general principle that "'only parties
to a lawsuit, or those
that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment"' (quoting Marino v.
Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988))).
186 See id. at 10 ( "The label 'party' does not indicate
an absolute characteristic, but
rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ
based on context.").
187

Id.

188 See

id. at 14 (rejecting the argument that "the structure of the rules of class action procedure requires intervention for the purposes of appeal"). An objector none-
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The answer given to the seemingly technical question of appellate
procedure in Devlin sheds light on the more difficult questions surrounding collateral attacks. Someone who is sub judice and has objected at the class-settlement approval stage has a right to appeal. But,
in so holding, Devlin qualifies substantially the notion that class members may simply "sit back" and remain unaffected by the outcome, as a
casual reading of Shutts might suggest. Put differently, Devlin conditions the opportunity for direct appeal on objection-if not intervention-in the trial court. As we shall elaborate momentarily, this nowestablished proposition in the post-Devlin world has unrecognized implications for the scope of collateral review with respect to classsettlement fairness questions-what we have deemed to be alleged
performance defects in the class representation.
2. Limitations
The fiduciary capabilities of any court are limited. Even a court
dedicated to "the highest degree of vigilance"'"'1 in its fiduciary role
stands at a considerable informational disadvantage vis-A.-vis classsettlement proponents, who are no longer adversaries but, now, willing buyers and sellers of the preclusion that would flow from a courtissued judgment.
The class action literature contains a variety of proposals that seek
to lessen these deficits. In an insightful article, William Rubenstein
categorizes these proposals in terms of "adversarial" and "regulatory"
approaches."O As the label suggests, adversarial approaches seek to
inject some measure of dispute into the direct review process when
the settling lawyers are no longer in such a posture-for example,
through the creation of financial incentives for objection or the appointment of a "devil's advocate" to critique the proposed deal.191

theless might find it strategically advantageous to seek intervenor status from the
court, as that would make the objector a "party" in the ordinary sense and thereby position her to seek limited discovery regarding the proposed deal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24
(describing standards for intervention); FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (confining discovery to those
with "party" status).
189 Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002).
190 William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1435, 1452-67 (2006) (describing four approaches: devil's
advocate, bonds, labels, and marks).
191 Financial incentives might range from, say, a
bond posted by the settling parties from which the court might make a fee award to objectors who improve the deal,
see id. at 1456-59, to outright replacement of incumbent class counsel by objectors who
succeed in showing that the proposed deal is unfair, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing
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Regulatory approaches seek to provide the court with assessments
from disinterested evaluators with expertise in the relevant settlement
subject area."'
Such efforts to improve the ability of courts on direct review to act
meaningfully as fiduciaries for the class are a useful starting point.
Still, both adversarial and regulatory approaches assume the benefits
of oversight outside of the judicial process for bad deals, and both are
vulnerable to the suggestion that collateral attacks might alter the incentives of the deal-making lawyers themselves by threatening the
commodity-preclusion-that they aspire to buy and sell with the
court's blessing.' 93 Cast in their best light, collateral attacks might
function as a kind of implicit penalty for efforts on the part of the
deal-making lawyers to "put one over on the court, in a staged per94
formance." 1
When presented with the benefits of settlement by friends of the
deal, courts are necessarily at a disadvantage, because they lack the
sort of information that would develop through true adversarial presentation. And even apart from informational deficiencies and adversarial presentation, there is always the risk that the reviewing court will
simply fail in the exercise of its supposed fiduciary role. Once again,
the single positive threatens to trump all the negatives. If the risk is
that the initial court might be captured, then the Panglossian account
would have it that collateral attacks offer the prospect of a second
check on judicial malfeasance. Unfortunately, such review also permits the anomalous court to reenter the picture as the forum for collateral attacks on duly certified and approved class settlements.

Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 633 (2003); Nagareda, supra
note 13, at 365. On the idea of a devil's advocate, see Rubenstein, supra note 190, at
1453-56.
192 See Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 1460-67
(creating a system of "labels" similar
to nutritional labels to evaluate class action settlements).
10 Rubenstein himself notes this additional
approach in his separate article on
collateral attacks. See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 840 ("Conceivably, the ready availability of collateral review could act like a sword of Damocles hanging over the initial
proceedings, forcing the participants in those proceedings to act in accord with the

requirements of adequate representation.").
194 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100
F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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B. Alternatives to CollateralAttack
Rival images emerge from the case law on challenges to class action settlements. From one perspective, courts are inherently vulnerable to fraud or collusion in approving a class settlement because of
the lack of true adversarialism in a judicial proceeding populated only
by friends of the deal. From another view, collateral attack serves as a
convenient stalking horse in a kind of multifront, guerilla warfare
against the deal"'15-one in which the object of the collateral challenge
conceivably might be favorable disposition of claims not even encompassed by the terms of the challenged settlement. Before turning to
collateral attacks as an adjunct to direct review, however, we note the
possibility of two other kinds of challenges to class settlements and
their limitations.
1. Rule 60(b)
Even in conventional individual litigation, it is not as if civil procedure lacks a way to address such things as newly discovered evidence
or fraud by one's party opponent as grounds to reopen a judgment.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules, for example, defines the grounds for
relief from civil judgments to include such matters. This built-in
safety valve serves to protect against collusion, newly discovered evidence (particularly if previously suppressed), or simple injustice in the
continued application of a civil judgment.
For a challenge to the performance side of a class settlementthat is, a claim that the deal obtained simply was not very good-there
is no reason that settlement should not be channeled through the
same prospective procedures as are available for other decrees or
judgments. Mediocre dispute resolutions are a fact of life and, absent
fraud or collusion, do not cry out for distinct treatment. But Rule
60(b) contains two limitations: it directs any such motion for relief to
the rendering court '" and limits motions on the grounds most pertinent to class settlements to a period of one year after entry of the
judgment." In steering motions for relief from judgment to the rendering court, Rule 60(b) is keeping with the effective channeling of

195 See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F.3d
293, 304 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing an injunction issued to "protect the settlement against guerilla warfare" from
dissenting lawyers).
196 See FED. R. Civ.
P. 60(b).
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other disputes concerning the preclusive effect of a federal court class
settlement to the rendering federal court by way of the AntiInjunction Act.198 This then eliminates the prospect of a search for
the anomalous court to undermine a federal class settlement-a notion consistent with the general Rule 60(b) framework.
2. Malpractice
The literature rightly has identified malpractice actions by absent
class members directly against class counsel as an alternative to collateral attacks. 9 9 But the same literature also notes the relative dearth of
information with which to evaluate the incidence of conduct that
would rise to the level of malpractice in legal representation undertaken in the class action setting.0 0 We do not enter this debate over
the appropriate bounds for the professional responsibility of lawyers
but, instead, simply note the essential premise of such actions, in contrast to collateral attacks. Actions for malpractice and the like (seeking damages or, perhaps, disgorgement by class counsel of their gains
from the representation) proceed on the premise that the class settlement is indeed binding. The requested remedy would redress in
some fashion the alleged wrong of that binding effect. 2°1 But malpractice on class counsel's part relieves neither class members nor defendants from the judgment outside of the parameters stated in Rule
60(b). And, though malpractice litigation might proceed in the
anomalous court, the nature of such litigation does not position that
court to overturn the binding effect of the rendering court's judgment.
C. ProperPreclusion in CollateralAttacks
We now arrive at the subject of collateral attacks themselves. The
term "collateral attack" is used here in a narrow sense-to refer to the
ability to seek review outside the processes of direct appeal and Rule

198See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
199See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 32, at 1069-80 (discussing prospects for mal-

practice actions in the class settlement context).
200 Id. at 1084.
201 See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 100 F.3d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that class members'
malpractice claim against class counsel "takes the [class] judgment as a given-indeed,
it is only so long as the judgment stands that the litigant has a compensable loss").
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60(b) review, including in a new forum. 2 2 The simplest part of the
argument is that such challenges must be limited to structural problems that target either the power of the rendering court to act or the
integrity of thejudicial process for objection before that court. Under
our approach, therefore, it is proper to calibrate collateral attacks
based on the nature of the representational defect that they raise.
There is a difference between challenges directed at the authority to
aggregate at all and challenges to the outcome of the deal in a properly aggregated case-what we have termed "performance defects."
Our analysis also points toward a distinction based on the nature
of the court that entered the class judgment. Our intuition is that the
law can sensibly mediate the competing risks of captured rendering
courts and anomalous courts for collateral attack by reference to the
jurisdictional authority of the court of first instance. Here, the combined effects of CAFA, federal MDL procedure, and the existing
framework of the Anti-Injunction Act point the way.
Where the class action is in a particular federal forum as a result
of congressional determination that (1) the case is one of nationalmarket significance, and (2) a single forum needs to be created, then
collateral attacks should be directed to the rendering federal court.
Where the class action is in state court, either because the underlying
dispute is localized or because the settling parties have sought to avoid
the federal forum made available by Congress, then challenges to the
class representation should be contestable in a subsequent forum.
The preceding distinction between structural and performance
defects in the class representation continues to apply wherever the
class representation is brought. The practical point is this: collateral
attacks on state court class judgments may proceed in another court
system where jurisdiction can be found. However, collateral attacks
on federal court class settlements are channeled by the AntiInjunction Act-properly so, in our view-back to the rendering federal court, which then stands to rule upon the propriety of its own earlier rendering process for the class-wide judgment. This approach ac-

A collateral attack immediately prompts the defense that claim preclusion from
the class judgment extinguished all claims arising from the disputed "transaction."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1980) (noting that a "valid and final
judgment" extinguishes "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant
with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of transactions, out of which
the action arose"). On the prospects for rendering courts to limit the preclusive effect
of their own judgments in class actions, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class
Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 717, 770-76 (2005).
202
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cords at an operational level with our intuition that the settling parties
should enjoy a greater security of repose if they satisfy the more exacting standards associated with class settlement under unifying federal
procedural standards. In terms of on-the-ground practice, if not as a
formal matter, the prospects for successful collateral attack ought to
differ where the rendering forum is fixed by federal law, as compared
to where that forum results from the selection of private parties capable, in effect, of "shopping the deal."
1. Structural Defects
Neither full claim preclusion, at one extreme, nor lack of preclusion, at the other, captures what is at stake in challenges over structural defects. In the event of a class settlement, absent class members
may raise both structural and performance defects arising from the
class representation in the rendering court, and that court retains
dis2
03
cretion to alter its initial class certification prior tojudgment.
Full claim preclusion nonetheless does not address the procedural
oddity of how structural defects are likely to be presented to the court
of first instance. The initial-and, in practice, usually determinativeinquiry into structural defects in the ordinary sequence occurs unbeknownst to absent class members, as part of the judicial decision to
certify the class in the first place.
Take, for example, the situation in
which a class is certified for litigation purposes and settlement occurs
only subsequently. When certification precedes settlement, the motion for certification is likely to be contested by the defendant, who
will have self-interested reasons to raise all manner of counterarguments in an effort to derail class certification in any form. The fact
that the rendering court might consider and reject a structural defect
raised by the defendant may well bear on preclusion in a later collateral attack, as we shall see momentarily, but only along lines adapted
from issue-preclusion principles to the class action context, not notions of claim preclusion. The image of the defendant as a kind of
constitutional policeman for the proposed class matches poorly with
the core notion behind claim preclusion-that of an opportunity to
raise structural defects that someone on the same side of the action as

203

See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (providing that a class certification order "may

be altered or amended before finaljudgment").
204 Rule 23(c) (2) requires notice to class members
only with respect to certified
class actions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2) (A)-(B).
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the collateral attack plaintiff (or, at least, owing her a fiduciary duty)
somehow has bypassed.
Suggestions of no preclusion sweep too broadly in the opposite
direction, according no significance even to a fiduciary court's wellinformed and considered rejection of a structural challenge made by
the very same class member now suing as the collateral-attack plaintiff.
Indeed, such a view would admit of no distinctions across situations in
which the structural defect is not raised at all in the rendering court
and those where it is raised, respectively, by the defendant in opposition to class certification, by the court sua sponte in its fiduciary capacity, by some other absent class member, or by the same absent class
member now suing collaterally. A no-preclusion view likewise would
not distinguish a genuine fiduciary court from an anomalous court
disinclined to take seriously its obligations on direct review.
For structural defects, a middle solution is warranted. 20" At the
very least, adaptation of preclusion principles for collateral attacks
should guard against the situation of a literal "do-over." It would be
intolerable to allow a collateral-attack plaintiff to escape the binding
effect of a class settlement by raising the same structural defects in the
class representation that she previously had raised on direct review in°6
the original court and where she had lost on that precise point.
Preclusion in what one might term a "been there, done that" scenario
calls for little translation of conventional issue-preclusion principles
cast in terms of what has been "actually litigated" and "determined"
between the same "parties" in the rendering court.0 7 Clearly, there
must be finality where the very same class member made the same

205 As to structural defects, we find ourselves
broadly in accord with William
Rubenstein's recent call for a "nuanced, middle-ground approach" for collateral attacks. Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 829. Rubenstein, however, grounds his analysis in
a comparison of collateral attacks to habeas litigation involving claims of ineffective
assistance, a comparison that puts aside consideration of forum selection, see supra note
26, and tends to cast the representational defect as one of deficient performance
rather than structural conflict of interest. We see a middle solution as suited for structural defects but less so for the kinds of performance defects most closely analogous to
ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal trial. See supra Part III.C.2.
206 See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.3d 141,
149 (3d Cir. 2005) ("All
three sets of Appellants ... have already raised and litigated [before the rendering
court] the challenges they argue here."). One of us represented class counsel in this
case and thereafter defended the Third Circuit's decision against a petition for certiorari ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court. See id. at 143; Brief in Opposition for
Respondent Class Counsel, Clark v. Wyeth, Inc., 547 U.S. 1109 (2006) (No. 05-1111).
0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (summarizing conventional
principles of issue preclusion).
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structural claims in the form of an original objection in the rendering
court. No plausible conception of adequate representation can countenance a literal re-presentation of the same structural claim collaterally. A case involving no consideration of the alleged structural defect
by the rendering court occupies the opposite end of the preclusion
spectrum. Once one rejects-as we think the law must-an approach
rooted in notions of claim preclusion, the inquiry necessarily shifts
from the mere existence of an opportunity to raise the structural defect to a determination of some sort on that matter.
The hard question for any translation of issue-preclusion principles to collateral attacks concerns the degree of relaxation, if any, that
the class action warrants in notions of "party" status. Should the law
adhere, in other words, to a conventional conception of "party" status,
whereby the plaintiff in a collateral attack can be bound only by the
rejection of a structural objection that she herself has raised in the
rendering court? The nature of class actions and the direct review
process, together, persuade us against such a literalistic rendering of
issue-preclusion principles in the class action setting. 20 Indeed, one
may see the question here for collateral attacks as the cousin once removed of the debate in Devlin over the "party" status of absent class
members for purposes of direct appeal. Here, as the Devlin Court ultimately realized, if only backhandedly, functional consequences-not
formalistic notions of "party" status-show the way.
A fiduciary conception of direct review suggests that what should
matter for a collateral attack is the rigor of the rendering court's determination of the structural question, not necessarily whether that
question has been "actually litigated" by someone in the familiar, adversarial litigation sense. When the basis for preclusion turns on what
the rendering court has done-where there may be nothing "actually
litigated" in the conventional sense-then it should not matter that
the defendant, rather than someone aligned on the plaintiffs' side,
has raised the structural defect that the rendering court rejected.
What matters is the existence of a determination by the rendering
court, such that the raising of a structural defect by the defendant in a
contested class certification properly may trigger preclusion of class
members.

208

For insistence on such an understanding, see Epstein II, 126 F.3d 1235, 1242

(9th Cir. 1997) ("The individual objectors who voluntarily appeared at the fairness

hearing were not authorized by the absentees to represent their interests, nor were
they certified by the [rendering court] to do so.").
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Our focus on the rendering court's determination has real teeth.
A determination, on our account, means a reasoned determination,
not a passing, boilerplate dismissal of the structural objection or an
unspecific assertion about the absence of any structural defect in the
class representation. Rather, the court must articulate the alleged defect and explain why it is not disabling. One helpful model here
might be an administrative agency's reasoned explanation of the
grounds for rejecting counterarguments to its chosen course of action, so
as to save agency action from judicial invalidation on grounds of arbitrariness. 2 °9
The importance of insistence on a reasoned determination by the
rendering court rests less on rough analogies in public law, however,
and more on the incentives that such a view generates for both the
settling lawyers on direct review and rivals who might undertake collateral attacks. For the settling lawyers, a reasoned determination as
the touchstone for preclusion places a premium on the generation of
a detailed record on the matters considered by the rendering court.
As for issue preclusion in ordinary litigation, the burden of showing
that the rendering court made an actual determination rests with the
party asserting preclusion. 210
Inducement of counsel to build a record in the rendering court
creates the right incentives for parties to make the certification decision a meaningful event, not just a show put on by the friends of the
deal. Already, there is a growing recognition by lower courts that class
certification requirements present "a mixed question of fact and
law.",2 1' In contested certifications, courts now routinely allow for con209

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,

52 (1983) (emphasizing that the agency "must explain the evidence which is available,
and must offer a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made"'
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
For an elaboration of the analogy to administrative-law arbitrariness review, see Nagareda, supra note 13, at 357-59.
210 See 18 CuARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4420, at 516-18 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the allocation of burden).
211 In re IPO Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d Cir.
2006). HJ0 Securities is the most
recent in a series of federal appellate decisions that lend greater content to the Supreme Court's cryptic admonition in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177
(1974), that trial-level courts lack "authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action."
In IPO Securities, the Second Circuit underscored this point: "the fact that a Rule 23
requirement might overlap with an issue on the merits does not avoid the court's obligation to make a ruling as to whether the requirement is met." 471 F.3d at 27. Accord,
e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecomm., Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 268 (5th
Cir. 2007) ("A district court.., must give full and independent weight to each Rule 23
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trolled discovery and evidentiary hearings, such that the rendering
court will "receive enough evidence, by affidavits, documents, or testimony, to be satisfied that each Rule 23 requirement has been
met.''2 12 Our proposal would extend this approach from contested
certifications to the context of class settlements, effectively creating an
incentive for settling counsel to build a body of evidence to elicit and
support the rendering court's determination of structural defects with
the potential to form the grounds for collateral attack. An approach
to preclusion in collateral review that effectively advantages the presentation of information to the rendering court can help to reduce the
informational deficit facing courts at the settlement stage, along with
refinement of the direct review process itself.
By tying preclusion to what has been determined by the rendering
court, we can both provide incentives for the presentation of fuller information to the first court and limit the scope of collateral review by
potentially anomalous second courts. There undoubtedly remains a
degree of wiggle room in this inquiry, of course, and one may expect
users of anomalous courts for collateral attacks to attempt to exploit
it. Still, we regard that degree of latitude as a tolerable price for the
law to bear in order to bring the standard for collateral review of
structural defects into accord with both the nature and the limitations
of direct review by a fiduciary court.
2. Performance Defects
Performance defects in class representation present not a question of authority in the ordinary sense of defects in "jurisdiction," but
rather, a question of results. Accordingly, preclusion of collateral attacks should extend more broadly. The hard question concerns how
to set the parameters for preclusion to achieve such a relative ordering. Here, we find a translation of claim-preclusion principles to hold
more promise.

requirement, regardless of whether that requirement overlaps with the merits." (internal citation omitted)); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.
2001) ("[I]f some of the considerations under Rule 23(b)(3) ... overlap the merits[,] ...then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits.").
One prescient commentator largely anticipated the approach now adopted in IPO
Securities. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 87 (2004) (recommending that courts "investigate the merits provided
that doing so is convenient and useful to analyzing the [applicable class] certification
requirements").
212 IPO Securities, 471 F.3d at 41.
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Unlike the initial inquiry into the adequacy of representation in
the structural sense, direct review of the class counsel's performance
in a proposed class settlement takes place only upon notice to absent
class members. This holds true when settlement postdates class certification 21 3 and for simultaneous consideration of the certification and
214
class-settlement fairness questions.
Notice differs, in short, across
structural and performance defects in a way that tracks the intuitive
difference between the two as grounds for challenges to the adequacy
of the class representation.
Using claim-preclusion principles for collateral review of performance defects would, of course, render insufficient the kind of nonexistent inquiry into that subject by the rendering court in the Hansbeny
era.2 1
Latter-day "drive-by" approvals for class settlements should
meet the same fate. 2 ' 6 But the inquiry for collateral review also extends beyond these extreme forms of dereliction to the modern eye.
There is the added implication from Devlin that any absent class
member who does not object at the trial level may not thereafter take
a direct appeal from a settlement approval. Because notice is not required when the court undertakes its initial inquiry into structural defects for purposes of class certification, the bypassing of a later opportunity to object on that ground should not carry the same degree of
collateral foreclosure as for performance defects. But absent class
members may fairly be held individually responsible for bypassing the
opportu'nity to raise performance defects when adequate notice of a
proceeding to that end has been provided, just as they now are held to
have bypassed a direct appeal.
A full and fair opportunity to raise performance defects presupposes adequate notice, itself part of the due process checklist set forth
in Shutts. Like the inquiry into structural defects, considerations of
adequate notice can place outer limits on those whom a class may encompass by identifying situations where even the "best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort," 21 7 would

See FED. R. CI. P. 23(c)(2)(A)-(B) (requiring notice only as to certified class
actions).
214 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B) (requiring notice of a proposed class settlement
to "all class members who would be bound by a proposed settlement").
215 See supra text accompanying notes 175-176.
2 The Senate Report on CAFA expressed concern over
"drive-by class certification cases." S. REP. No. 109-14, at 22 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 22.
217 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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likely leave predictable, systematic gaps within the proposed class. 2 18 A
world in which seemingly every trivial document or video manages to
find its way onto some internet blog or YouTube, moreover, is surely a
world where courts can make full and fair, in operational terms, the
opportunity to object-and
with much less expense to the judicial sys19
tem than in decades past.2

3. The Settlement Forum
Any account that contemplates some nontrivial latitude for collat-

eral challenges to class settlements-certainly, ours-cannot eliminate
entirely the incentive to search for the anomalous court for such review. The prospect that any cohesive theory for judicial review will
garner a comparably unified endorsement by courts throughout the
country, moreover, is sufficiently small as to dampen even the academic ego. We cannot help but observe, nonetheless, how the ongoing debate over collateral attacks reinforces the impulse of CAFA in a

way not previously appreciated.
Uncertainty over the scope available for collateral attackswhether the macro-level confusion in current law or the micro-level
questions about the operation of a regime such as ours-effectively
increases the cost associated with parking a class settlement in any
state court. The lack of injunctive power to enforce the preclusive effect of a state court class settlement is what turns the preclusion ques-

In dicta, the Amchem Court expressed concern over the adequacy of the extensive notice campaign contemplated there with respect to asbestos-exposed workers'
family members who might not know of their exposure. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997). By contrast, the concern voiced in Amchem for persons
who do not know their ultimate medical fate at the time of the class judgment, id., has
not rendered inadequate notice campaigns for mass tort class settlements where the
fact of exposure is known. See Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs
Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 99-20593, 2000 Wl 32067308, at *39 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (emphasizing that "there are no class members unwittingly exposed to the diet drugs, which
were available only through a doctor's prescription and had to be consciously ingested").
219 For an illustration in state law of a more flexible
approach to notice, by comparison to Rule 23, see CAL. CIv. R. 3.766(f) which notes that, "[i]f personal notification is unreasonably expensive or the stake of individual class members is insubstantial,
or if it appears that all members of the class cannot be notified personally, the court
may order a means of notice reasonably calculated to apprise the class members of the
pendency of the action-for example, publication in a newspaper or magazine; broadcasting on television, radio, or the Internet; or posting or distribution through a trade
or professional association, union, or public interest group.".
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tion into one for consideration in a collateral forum. 2 2 0 In order to
avoid that inquiry entirely, and to recast the preclusion question into a
federal injunctive question for the rendering court, lawyers are best
advised to do for settlement purposes what CAFA prescribes for defendants with regard to contested certifications: get thee to federal court.
In practice, this means that collateral attacks will be less viable
where the law has more confidence in the rendering court by virtue of
congressional choice-chiefly, by way of CAFA, but also through the
operation of the MDL process and the Anti-Injunction Act, both of
which are themselves matters of federal legislative authorization.
Here, practical operation aligns with normative intuition.
The effective federalization of class settlements would reinforce
the advantage that CAFA unintentionally confers on plaintiffs' lawyers
positioned to play for national stakes. 2 Those lawyers now may invest
in class litigation to challenge national-market activity with the assurance that removal under CAFA and consolidation of related cases
within the federal system, together, will inhibit efforts by rivals to garner the certification of a copycat class action and, with it, control of
the litigation-or at least the chance to extract rents. Recognition of
the federal forum as a way to avoid questions about collateral attacks
only adds to the power of national players within the class action bar.
If national markets have led to both litigation and consequent demands for peace that are similarly national in scope, then, we suppose, it is only fitting that the masters of the post-CAFA universe
should be a segment of the plaintiffs' bar comprised of players at a
correspondingly national level.
But the effect of CAFA goes beyond simply magnifying the incentives for national-level counsel able to navigate the shoals of federal
courts. CAFA offers the prospect of greater finality to settlements realized in the courts selected by Congress as the appropriate fora for
cases of national significance. In such cases, settling parties in federal
court not only can garner full protection from subsequent challenges
to the performance outcomes of a class action settlement but also can
gain protection from collateral challenge in a potentially anomalous
2 2
court. 1
The injunctive powers of federal courts can force postSee supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
This effect is rightly highlighted in Erichson, supranote 36.
222 This proposal cures a defect in CAFA's jurisdictional grant carefully
identified
in Wolff, supra note 53, by which the right of removal is reserved to the defendant but
not to absent class members who may wish to challenge a settlement being "parked" in
a friendly state court.
220

221

1722

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 156:1649

settlement review into the familiar pathways of Rule 60(b) or even collateral review, but only in the court of first instance.
CONCLUSION

Slowly but surely, the Class Action Fairness Act is transforming
class action practice. The days of drive-by certifications in Alabama
and the nationwide reach of the judges of Madison County, Illinois,
are fading from the landscape.123 One need not yield to the optimism
of Dr. Pangloss to recognize that many of the most abusive practices of
forum manipulation, sweetheart deals, and questionable class certifications have, at the very least, been curbed.
Our attention in this Article, however, is to the unexplored doctrinal inheritance that a shakier era of class action practice has left
behind. Once removed from the concern about rogue courts improperly certifying national class actions, the accompanying doctrines
of collateral challenge stand alone more precariously. Or more directly stated, once Congress has interceded to determine the forum in
which cases of national import should be adjudicated, doctrines that
permit any court to revisit class judgments at any time-obtained by
settlement or trial-lose whatever core justification they may once
have enjoyed;
Viewed from the perspective of a concern about the anomalous
court-the more polite rendition of captured or rogue judicial systems-the broad and imprecise sweep of the term "collateral challenge" is perhaps explicable. But when forum concerns are removed,
or at least allayed, expansive notions of collateral challenge not only
are unjustified, they also emerge as a backdoor invitation for the reassertion of power by anomalous courts once again. Our hope is that by
disentangling the "where," "what," and "how" of class-settlement review, the residual force of improper attacks on such settlements can
be curbed appropriately.
At the end of the day, class actions have emerged as a necessary
evolutionary response to the problems of mass society. For as long as
they are part of our legal system, class actions need to be litigated or
settled with finality, just as every other sort of legal proceeding does.
No more, but certainly no less.
223 For further discussion of the implications of increased
federal oversight, see
David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action FairnessAct, and Some FederalismImplications ofDiversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1296-1304 (2007), which argues that
CAFA operates in tension with Erie's principles concerning federal-state relations.

